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Abstract
This Article beings by sketching the background of the recent Rwandan Patriotic Front (”RPF”)
trial, focusing on domestic impunity for RPF crimes and strained relations between Rwanda and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (”ICTR”). It next describes and analyzes the
components of the ICTR-Rwanda agreement: the agreement itself, the RPF trial, and the ICTR
prosecutor’s assessment of the trial. The Article then explores the larger issues of prosecutorial
discretion and independence, complementarily, and victor’s justice, while examining the implica-
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“[T]he desire displayed by states to try their own defendants is often 
inversely proportional to their ability or real desire to do so. What will 
happen, then, in the context of [the International Criminal Court] 
Statute that confers primary jurisdiction on the states?” 
—Claude Jorda1 
“This Tribunal must not be seen as victor’s justice when the history books 
are written in fifteen years.” 
—Erik Møse2 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”), the 
predominantly Tutsi rebel movement that had triggered 
 
*  Senior Lecturer in International Human Rights Law, Centre for Applied Human 
Rights and York Law School, University of York. This Article is dedicated to Alison Des 
Forges who was deeply committed to impartial justice for all of Rwanda’s victims. I want 
to thank Thierry Cruvellier, Roger Des Forges, Fidelma Donlon, Aloys Habimana, Scott 
Straus, and Carina Tertsakian for numerous discussions on and around this topic. I am 
grateful to Leslie Haskell, Jennifer Trahan, Aldo Zammit-Borda, and especially Victor 
Peskin for insightful comments on an earlier draft. I also thank Jennifer Trahan and the 
Fordham International Law Journal for inviting me to speak at the symposium, at which I 
first presented some of the ideas contained in this Article. 
1. Claude Jorda, The Major Hurdles and Accomplishments of the ICTY: What the ICC 
Can Learn From Them, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 572, 582 (2004). 
2. Interview with Judge Erik Møse, then-President of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR], in Arusha, Tanz. (Mar. 17, 2003). 
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Rwanda’s four-year civil war, killed at least 25,000–30,000 Hutu 
civilians.3 Those deaths barely registered amidst the half million 
or more Tutsi civilians slaughtered during the genocide that 
same year.4 The historian and human rights activist Alison Des 
Forges tried to draw attention to those crimes in Leave None to 
Tell the Story, her magisterial account of the Rwandan genocide.5 
Writing in 1999, she criticized the “mere pretense of justice” for 
the victims, and the international community’s indifference.6 
Ten years later, the prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) announced that he would not 
indict a single RPF soldier for those crimes.7 A year earlier, in 
2008, he had agreed to let Rwanda conduct its own domestic trial 
of a case previously investigated by his office on the 
understanding that he would reassert jurisdiction if the trial was 
not fair or effective.8 Rwanda then put four RPF soldiers9 on trial 
for the notorious massacre of the Rwandan archbishop, three 
bishops, and nine other clergy at Gakurazo in June 1994.10 This 
was the first—and only—domestic prosecution of RPF soldiers 
for 1994 war crimes. The trial opened with guilty pleas from two 
low-ranking soldiers11 and ended with the acquittals of their 
 
3. ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 734 
(1999). 
4. Id. at 15–16. There is a highly politicized debate over the number killed during 
the genocide. See, e.g., Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to 
Dictatorship, 103 AFR. AFF. 177, 178 n.1 (2004). 
5. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 692–735. 
6. Id. at 735. 
7. U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 (June 4, 2009). 
8. U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5904th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5904 (June 4, 2008). 
9. Like many guerrilla movements, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”) had both 
a political wing (the RPF) and a military wing (the Rwandan Patriotic Army (“RPA”)), 
with the latter controlling the former. When the RPF created a new government after 
the genocide, it installed a civilian member of the RPF, Pasteur Bizimungu, as the titular 
president, but the real power lay with then-Major General Paul Kagame, who occupied 
the vice-presidential and defense minister posts. In 2000, Kagame ousted Bizimungu and 
assumed the presidency. He “resigned” from the military to run for president in 
national elections in 2003. As there is little distinction between the RPF and RPA (since 
renamed) and little (if any) civilian control over the military, I use the terms “RPF” and 
“RPF soldiers” throughout this article. 
10. See U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5904th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5904 (June 4, 
2008); Felly Kimenyi, RDF Officers Appear Before Court, NEW TIMES (Kigali), June 17, 2008, 
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?article=7195. 
11. See Kimenyi, supra note 10. 
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commanding officers.12 The prosecutor expressed satisfaction 
with the trial and closed his own investigation.13 
This episode reflects the current paradigm of international 
criminal justice—complementarity—which underpins the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”). Under the principle of 
complementarity, national jurisdictions get the first crack at 
prosecuting genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, 
with the ICC only operating as a court of last resort for those 
states that prove unwilling or unable to prosecute. This paradigm 
accords with the intuition that national courts are often better 
positioned to do justice than are international courts.14 
Complementarity is thought to have several advantages over the 
jurisdictional primacy of the ad hoc international tribunals for 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia: it is more deferential to state 
sovereignty, it promotes the diffusion of international norms at 
the national level, and it is much less expensive. 
To date, the ICC has had no experience monitoring 
“complementary” national trials. Consequently, much of the 
discussion of complementarity is highly theorized and highly 
speculative. This is what makes the agreement between the ICTR 
and Rwanda, and the resulting domestic trial, so important: they 
may well be harbingers for how “complementarity” plays out at 
the ICC.15 First, they suggest that international tribunals will be 
unable or reluctant to recognize sham national proceedings 
 
12. See Edwin Musoni, Gumisiriza Acquitted, NEW TIMES (Kigali), Oct. 25, 2008. 
13. U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 (June 4, 2009). 
14. See Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy 
Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, at 2 (Sept. 2003), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b25-60aa962ed8b6/
143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf. National courts are more likely to obtain witnesses 
and evidence, be more accessible to victims and affected communities, more efficient, 
and less costly than international ones. See William W. Burke-White, Proactive 
Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of 
International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 68–69 (2008); Paper on Some Policy Issues Before 
the Office of the Prosecutor, supra. Other scholars go further, arguing that national justice is 
better when it comes to promoting accountability, reconciliation, victim satisfaction, 
collective memory, democratic deliberation, and the rule of law. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, 
Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 482 (1999). 
15. See Victor Peskin, Caution and Confrontation in the International Criminal Court’s 
Pursuit of Accountability in Uganda and Sudan, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 655, 660 (2009) (noting 
that “the actions taken by the chief prosecutors of the ICTY [International Criminal 
Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia] and ICTR [International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda] provide important precedents for their counterpart at the ICC [International 
Criminal Court]”). 
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designed to shield the accused. Second, they make clear that 
state cooperation is the Achilles’ heel of international justice. 
Finally, they remind us that international justice is inherently 
political. 
This Article begins by sketching the background of the 
recent RPF trial, focusing on domestic impunity for RPF crimes 
and strained relations between Rwanda and the ICTR. It next 
describes and analyzes the components of the ICTR-Rwanda 
agreement: the agreement itself, the RPF trial, and the ICTR 
prosecutor’s assessment of the trial. The Article then explores 
the larger issues of prosecutorial discretion and independence, 
complementarity, and victor’s justice, while examining the 
implications for the ICC. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. RPF Crimes and National Impunity: 1994–2007 
The RPF’s mostly Tutsi soldiers committed crimes against 
humanity and war crimes against mostly Hutu civilians in Rwanda 
in 1994.16 A United Nations (“U.N.”) appointed Commission of 
Experts found that the RPF soldiers had “perpetrated serious 
breaches of international humanitarian law [i.e., war crimes] and 
crimes against humanity,” and it “strongly recommend[ed]” 
 
16. See DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 701–26. This Article focuses on 1994, as the 
ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction is limited to that single year. However, RPF soldiers also 
killed Hutu civilians during the civil war, which started with its October 1, 1990 invasion 
from Uganda and ended in July 1994 with the military defeat of the genocidal regime. 
See id. Furthermore, RPF soldiers killed thousands of Hutu civilians after 1994: during 
the closing of internally displaced persons camps in 1995, the anti-insurgency campaign 
in northwest Rwanda in 1997 and 1998, and the wars in the eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo. See, e.g., GÉRARD PRUNIER, FROM GENOCIDE TO CONTINENTAL WAR: 
THE ‘CONGOLESE’ CONFLICT AND THE CRISIS OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICA 16–23, 37–42, 
147–48 (2008). There has been virtually no accountability for any of those crimes. See 
Fed’n Internationale des Ligues des Droits de L’homme [FIDH] [Int’l Fed’n for Human 
Rights], Victims in the Balance: Challenges Ahead for the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, at 64, Oct. 25, 2002 (providing statistics of RPA soldiers prosecuted for human 
rights crimes between 1996 and 2000). In mid-2009, a United Nations (“U.N.”) “justice 
mapping exercise” completed a report on crimes against humanity and war crimes 
committed by Rwanda and other actors in the Democratic Republic of Congo. See Jason 
Stearns & Federico Borello, Bad Karma: Accountability for Rwandan Crimes in the Congo, in 
REMAKING RWANDA: STATE BUILDING & HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER MASS VIOLENCE (Scott 
Straus & Lars Waldorf eds., forthcoming 2011). 
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prosecution of those crimes.17 Experts working for the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees estimated that the RPF killed an 
estimated 25,000 to 45,000 Hutu civilians from April to August 
1994.18 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
investigated and publicized the RPF massacres.19 As Des Forges 
observed: 
These killings were wide-spread, systematic and involved 
large numbers of participants and victims. They were too 
many and too much alike to have been unconnected crimes 
executed by individual soldiers or low-ranking officers. Given 
the disciplined nature of the RPF forces and the extent of 
communication up and down the hierarchy, commanders of 
this army must have known of and at least tolerated these 
practices.20 
There were credible reports that the RPF’s military commander, 
Major General (now President) Paul Kagame, knew about some 
of these killings but took no action to stop them.21 
 
17. The Secretary-General, Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935, ¶ 95, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (Dec. 9, 1994). 
18. See DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 726–31. Despite U.N. efforts to suppress these 
findings, the figures were leaked to the press. See id. 
19. See id. at 702–26; Amnesty Int’l, Rwanda: Reports of Killings and Abductions by the 
Rwandese Patriotic Army, April–August 1994, AI Index AFR 47/016/1994, Oct. 20, 1994. 
Filip Reyntjens, a long-time Rwanda expert, has explained why these crimes are not 
better known: 
Apart from considerations of guilt and political correctness, several factors 
explain the conspiracy of silence. On the one hand, most massacres by the RPF 
occurred discreetly, and investigations were difficult: areas where they were 
committed were declared “military zones” (closed to outsiders), victims’ 
remains were removed or burned, and regions were closed to access and even 
air traffic. On the other hand, observers had an interest in keeping silent: 
witnesses of NGOs and international organizations feared expulsion, and 
Rwandans ran the risk of reprisals against themselves . . . . 
Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda: L’Histoire Secrète (Review), AFR. TODAY, Spring 2008, at 141, 142 
(citation omitted); see also DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 731–34. Reyntjens has been 
barred from Rwanda ever since he documented some RPF massacres in late 1994. 
20. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 734–35. 
21. See id. at 735. Seth Sendashonga, a high-ranking RPF official, who went into 
exile in 1995 and denounced Kagame over RPF killings, estimated that RPF soldiers 
killed approximately 60,000 civilians between April 1994 and August 1995. Human 
Rights Watch, Law and Reality: Progress in Judicial Reform in Rwanda, at 89, July 2008 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/rwanda0708webwcover.pdf. 
Sendashonga was assassinated in Nairobi in 1998. See PRUNIER, supra note 16, at 365–68; 
Amnesty Int’l, Rwanda/Kenya: Inquiry into Assassination of Rwandese Opposition Leader in 
Exile Urgently Needed, AI Index AFR 47/19/1998, May 18, 1998. 
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The RPF-led regime has made very little effort at 
accountability for these crimes. As the human rights activist 
André Sibomana ruefully observed, “Impunity is always in the 
interest of the state, and the current state in Rwanda is no 
exception.”22 Over the years, President Kagame has countered 
such criticism in three ways. First, he minimizes both the nature 
and extent of RPF crimes, acknowledging only “revenge killings” 
by a small number of rogue soldiers.23 Second, he claims the 
Rwandan government has brought those soldiers to justice.24 
Finally, he equates justice for RPF crimes with genocide denial: 
While some rogue RPF elements committed crimes against 
civilians during the civil war after 1990, and during the anti-
genocidal campaign, individuals were punished severely . . . . 
To try to construct a case of moral equivalency between 
genocide crimes and isolated crimes committed by rogue 
RPF members is morally bankrupt and an insult to all 
Rwandans, especially survivors of the genocide. Objective 
history illustrates the degeneracy of this emerging 
revisionism.25 
President Kagame contends that “‘the country’s military 
tribunals have conducted very serious investigations’ into the 
crimes and that ‘some of our soldiers were proven guilty, 
convicted and executed.’”26 Yet, by the end of 1998, military 
courts had prosecuted only thirty-two soldiers for twenty-one 
crimes (involving ninety-two civilian victims) committed in 
1994.27 All were prosecuted for ordinary murder, not war crimes 
 
22. ANDRE SIBOMANA, HOPE FOR RWANDA: CONVERSATIONS WITH LAURE GUILBERT 
AND HERVE DEGUINE 107 (1999). 
23. See DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 732–33. As Des Forges pointed out, “Revenge 
killings by soldiers—or other crimes of passion—as well as the unintentional killing of 
civilians in combat situations could never account for the thousands of persons killed by 
the RPF between April and late July 1994.” Id. at 734. 
24. See FIDH, supra note 16, at 16. 
25. President Paul Kagame, Preface to AFTER GENOCIDE: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA AND BEYOND xxiii 
(Phil Clark & Zachary D. Kaufman eds., 2008). 
26. FIDH, supra note 16, at 16; see also Martin Ngoga, The Institutionalisation of 
Impunity: A Judicial Perspective on the Rwandan Genocide, in AFTER GENOCIDE: 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONCILIATION IN 
RWANDA AND BEYOND, supra note 25, at 331; Rwanda Denies Rebels Escaped Justice over 
Genocide, AFRICA TIMES NEWS, June 3, 2009, http://www.africa-times-news.com/2009/
06/rwanda-denies-rebels-escaped-justice-over-genocide (quoting the Minister of Justice). 
27. Law and Reality, supra note 21, at 103. Eleven of these suspects were never 
brought to trial and another three trials ended without any judgment. Id.; see also DES 
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or crimes against humanity—even in an infamous case involving 
the massacre of thirty civilians.28 Only two were higher-ranking 
officers: a lieutenant, who was acquitted; and a major, whose 
original life sentence was reduced to six years on appeal.29 The 
longest sentence imposed was six years and the typical sentence 
ranged from two to four years.30 In November 2002, Colonel 
Andrew Rwigamba, then the chief military prosecutor, told 
Human Rights Watch that there were no open files on 1994 
crimes.31 In fact, there were no prosecutions of 1994 RPF crimes 
from late 1998 until mid-2008.32 
The Rwandan government has also refused to allow civilian 
courts to try RPF crimes. Initially, Rwanda’s community courts 
(gacaca) had subject matter jurisdiction over war crimes.33 This 
was removed in 200434 after some people in pilot gacaca 
proceedings had demanded justice for RPF crimes. At one gacaca 
session that I attended in 2002, two gacaca judges pleaded for the 
court to investigate the arrest and subsequent disappearance of 
 
FORGES, supra note 3, at 733–34 (finding that six of twenty-one RPF soldiers arrested and 
charged with killing civilians in November 1994 were convicted and given short 
sentences); FIDH, supra note 16, at 64 (providing statistics of RPA soldiers prosecuted 
for human rights crimes between 1996 and 2000). 
28. Human Rights Watch, supra note 21, at 104–07. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Interview with Colonel Andrew Rwigamba, then-Military Prosecutor General 
(Auditorat Generale), in Kigali, Rwanda (Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with author). The Author 
ran Human Rights Watch’s field office in Kigali from early 2002 to early 2004. 
32. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Rwanda Tribunal Should Pursue Justice 
for RPF Crimes (Dec. 12, 2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/
12/rwanda-tribunal-should-pursue-justice-rpf-crimes. 
33. See Organic Law No. 40/2000 art. 1, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Rwanda, Mar. 15, 2001. A copy of the original law is electronically available on the 
National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions’ website at http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/
pdf/Law.pdf. For critical appraisals of gacaca, see Bert Ingelaere, The Gacaca Courts in 
Rwanda, in TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: 
LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 25–59 (Luc Huyse & Mark Salter eds., 2008). See 
also Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional 
Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 61 (2006); Max Rettig, Gacaca: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
in Rwanda, AFR. STUD. REV., Dec. 2008, at 25. For a much more positive assessment, see 
Phil Clark, Hybridity, Holism, and “Traditional” Justice: The Case of the Gacaca Courts in Post-
genocide Rwanda, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 765 (2007).  
34. See Organic Law No. 16/2004 art. 1, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Rwanda, June 19, 2004, consolidated as amended in Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Rwanda, Mar. 1, 2007; see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 21, at 90. An original 
copy of the 2004 law is also electronically available on the National Service of Gacaca 
Jurisdictions’ website at http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/newlaw1.pdf. 
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their family member by RPF soldiers in July 1994.35 The gacaca 
president and local officials told them not to confuse that with 
genocide and to take their allegations to the local political 
authorities or military courts.36 That was not an isolated 
incident.37 Rather remarkably, the government agency in charge 
of gacaca acknowledged in 2004, “There are even those who feel 
marginalized by gacaca because they do not judge the common 
crimes [such as murder and theft] committed during the war, 
that is between 1990 and 1994, and even those in 1998 in the 
north of the country [during the counterinsurgency].”38 
Finally, the government has been unwilling to entertain 
nonprosecutorial mechanisms for handling RPF crimes, such as a 
truth commission or commission of inquiry. Even more 
problematically, the government made few efforts to vet human 
rights abusers. The most notorious example is Fred Ibingira, who 
commanded the troops that massacred an estimated 2,000 to 
4,000 Hutu displaced persons at the Kibeho camp in April 1995.39 
Ibingira was sentenced to eighteen months in prison for “failing 
to give assistance to a person in danger.”40 After being released, 
he reassumed his position and President Kagame promoted him 
to General in 2004.41 
B. ICTR-Rwanda Relations: 1995–2007 
The Rwandan regime has displayed deep mistrust towards 
international justice. This is partly due to the low regard in which 
it holds the international community, particularly the United 
Nations, for failing to prevent or halt the 1994 genocide. More 
importantly, however, Rwanda is a de facto one-party state that 
does not share the liberal legalism underpinning international 
 
35. This was a gacaca session in Gitarama Province, Rwanda, in July 2002. 
36. Id. 
37. See, e.g., Rettig, supra note 33, at 40. 
38. Service National des Juridictions Gacaca [National Service of Gacaca 
Jurisdictions], Les Problèmes Constates Dans Le Fonctionnement Des Juridictions Gacaca Qui 
Ont Terminé Leur 7ème Réunion [The Problems Identified in the Functioning of the Gacaca 
Jurisdictions That Have Completed Their Seventh Meeting] (2004) (Rwanda) (translation 
provided by Author) (on file with Author). 
39. See PRUNIER, supra note 16, at 38–42. 
40. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2 MILITARY LAW REPORTS 306–07 (1999) (Rwanda). 
41. Pres. Order No. 35/01, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Oct. 1, 
2004, at 17. 
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justice.42 “For the RPF, the Arusha tribunal’s judicial process is a 
means to seal its military victory over the forces of genocide.”43 
The RPF also used the ICTR to discredit and marginalize Hutu 
democrats who were not tainted by the genocide.44 Finally, the 
regime is committed to ensuring there is no international justice 
for its crimes against humanity and war crimes in Rwanda and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Rwanda was the only state to vote against the creation of the 
ICTR, whose mandate permitted RPF prosecutions.45 Rwanda has 
not signed the Rome Statute and it has supported American 
efforts to weaken the International Criminal Court.46 Recently, 
Rwanda has led opposition to universal jurisdiction at the African 
Union (“A.U.”).47 Perhaps, most telling of all, Rwanda blocked 
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) from exercising 
jurisdiction over the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (“DRC”) 
claims that Rwanda had committed genocide in the eastern 
 
42. As Gary Bass observed, “Liberal governments sometimes pursue war crimes 
trials; illiberal ones never have.” GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: 
THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIME TRIBUNALS 8 (2000). On Rwanda’s illiberalism, see Human 
Rights Watch, Preparing for Elections: Tightening Controls in the Name of Unity, May 2003; 
Chi Mgbako et al., Front Line, Rwanda: Disappearances, Arrests, Threats, Intimidation and 
Co-option of Human Rights Defenders 2001–2004, at 7–30, 2005, available at 
http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/files/en/FrontLineRwandaReport.pdf; Reyntjens, 
supra note 4, at 177, 180–87 (2004). 
43. KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, RWANDA’S GENOCIDE: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL 
JUSTICE 137 (2005); see also Makau Mutua, From Nuremberg to the Rwanda Tribunal: Justice 
or Retribution?, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 77, 78 (2000) (contending that “[T]he Rwanda 
tribunal largely masks the illegitimacy of the Tutsi regime and allows Tutsis a moral 
plane from which to exact their revenge on the Hutus”). 
44. See THIERRY CRUVELLIER, COURT OF REMORSE: INSIDE THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 136-153 (Cheri Voss trans., 2010). 
45. VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS: VIRTUAL 
TRIALS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE COOPERATION 161–63 (2008). 
46. In 2003, Rwanda signed a so-called article 98 agreement with the United States, 
pledging that it would never hand over U.S. nationals to the ICC. Agreement Between 
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic 
of Rwanda Regarding the Surrender of Persons to International Tribunals, U.S.-Rwanda, 
Mar. 4, 2003, Temp. State Dep’t No. 03-104, 2003 WL 22309220. Former ICTR 
prosecutor Carla Del Ponte speculates that Rwanda signed an article 98 agreement in 
return for U.S. support to block ICTR investigations of RPF crimes. CARLA DEL PONTE, 
MADAME PROSECUTOR: CONFRONTATIONS WITH HUMANITY’S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE 
CULTURE OF IMPUNITY 231 (2008). 
47. See, e.g., Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of 
Universal Jurisdiction, ¶ 5, OAU Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 199(XI) (July 1, 2008). 
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DRC.48 Rwanda successfully argued that its reservation to Article 
IX of the Genocide Convention precluded the ICJ from hearing 
that case. As Judge Rosalyn Higgins and four other judges wrote 
in their concurring opinion, “It must be regarded as a very grave 
matter that a state should be in a position to shield from 
international judicial scrutiny any claim that might be made 
against it concerning genocide. A State so doing shows the world 
scant confidence that it would never, ever, commit genocide.”49 
It is all the more troubling when that state has built its political 
and moral legitimacy on stopping genocide. 
Rwanda’s relations with the ICTR have been fraught from 
the start. Rwanda objected to the tribunal’s location (in Tanzania 
rather than Rwanda), limited temporal jurisdiction (excluding 
the lead-up to the genocide from 1990 to 1993), primacy over 
Rwandan national courts, exclusion of civil parties, and refusal to 
apply the death penalty.50 Since then, Rwanda has regularly 
criticized the ICTR’s performance and occasionally suspended 
state cooperation.51 
The main point of contention between Rwanda and the 
ICTR has been over RPF crimes. Although the genocide was 
clearly the impetus for the ICTR’s creation, the U.N. Security 
Council mandated the tribunal to prosecute not only genocide, 
but also “other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law.”52 The Security Council’s intention that the ICTR prosecute 
RPF crimes is also clear from the tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction, 
 
48. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 6, 33 (Feb. 3). 
49. Id. at 71 (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada 
and Simma). 
50. See PESKIN, supra note 45, at 156–67. For examples of President Kagame’s 
ambivalence and opposition to the ICTR, see JOHN SHATTUCK, FREEDOM ON FIRE: 
HUMAN RIGHTS WARS AND AMERICA’S RESPONSE 51–76 (2003), and David P. Rawson, 
Prosecuting Genocide: Founding the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
641, 649 (2007). 
51. See, e.g., Ngoga, supra note 26, at 328–32. For early confrontations between the 
ICTR and Rwanda, particularly over Frouald Karamira and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, see 
CRUVELLIER, supra note 44, at 9–14, 102–14. See also PESKIN, supra note 45, at 170–85. 
Peskin convincingly argues that Rwanda’s success in these confrontations “created a 
tribunal dynamic of acquiescence vis-à-vis the Rwandan government . . . [which,] in turn, 
emboldened the government to strategically withhold cooperation in order to control 
the court at key junctures . . . .” PESKIN, supra note 45, at 170. 
52. S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
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which extends to December 31, 1994. 53 Rwanda wanted the cut-
off date to be mid-July 1994, when the genocide ended.54 In 
addition, the U.N. decided to situate the ICTR outside Rwanda 
“to ensure not only the reality but also the appearance of 
complete impartiality and objectivity in the prosecution of 
persons responsible for crimes committed by both sides to the 
conflict.”55 The Security Council reaffirmed its commitment to 
this with resolutions in 2003 and 2004 that explicitly called on 
Rwanda “to intensify cooperation with and render all necessary 
assistance to the ICTR, including on investigations of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army.”56 
Then-ICTR prosecutor Carla Del Ponte met President 
Kagame in December 2000 to notify him that she was opening 
investigations into RPF crimes.57 At a press conference a few days 
later, she precipitously announced she might have an indictment 
ready by the end of December 2001.58 She stated she had 
requested President Kagame’s cooperation, while 
acknowledging, “Let’s be realistic: without cooperation, I’ll get 
nowhere.”59 A year later, cooperation was still not forthcoming.60 
The confrontation between Rwanda and the ICTR over RPF 
crimes that had been building finally came to a head in 2002. In 
January, the main genocide survivors’ organization, Ibuka 
(Kinyarwanda for “Remember”), which had been co-opted by the 
 
53. Id. 
54. See PESKIN, supra note 45, at 162. The ICTR’s limited temporal jurisdiction also 
meant that it was not able to prosecute crimes committed after 1994 in Rwanda and 
Congo by the RPF and génocidaires. Id.; see Luc Reydams, The ICTR Ten Years On: Back to 
the Nuremberg Paradigm?, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 977, 980 (2005). This contrasts sharply 
with the ICTY’s open-ended jurisdiction, which enabled that Tribunal to prosecute 
crimes committed in Kosovo. 
55. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of 
the Security Council Resolution 955, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc., S/1995/134 (Feb. 13, 1995) 
(emphasis added). 
56. S.C. Res. 1534, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004); S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 3, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003). 
57. DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 184. In fact, these investigations had been 
initiated by Louise Arbour, Del Ponte’s predecessor, at the end of her term. 
CRUVELLIER, supra note 44, at 160. 
58. DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 185. She claims she made this public statement to 
prevent President Kagame from “backtrack[ing]” on his pledge of cooperation. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 186–87, 191; see MOGHALU, supra note 43, at 139 (speculating that 
Kagame may have faced a coup from hardliners in his military if he had cooperated with 
Del Ponte). 
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RPF in 2000,61 called on genocide survivors to boycott the 
tribunal.62 In April, Del Ponte publicly criticized Rwanda for lack 
of cooperation with the so-called “special investigations” and 
promised to hand down RPF indictments by the end of the year.63 
When Ibuka’s boycott failed to slow the trials, the Rwandan 
government was forced to show its hand. In June 2002, it 
imposed burdensome travel restrictions that prevented 
prosecution witnesses from going to Arusha to testify.64 This had 
the desired effect: three trials were adjourned for lack of 
witnesses.65 Kigali’s action seemed to prove Louise Arbour’s 
prediction: “How could we investigate and prosecute the RPF 
while we [the prosecutor’s investigators] were based in that 
country? It was never going to happen. They would shut us 
down.”66 More remarkably, the RPF decided to shut down 
 
61. Antoine Mugesera, a member of the RPF’s central committee, was appointed 
president of Ibuka in 2000, the same year that several Tutsi survivors critical of the RPF’s 
policies were effectively neutralized. See Human Rights Watch, The Search for Security and 
Human Rights Abuses, at 10–11 (Apr. 1, 2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/
reports/2000/rwanda; Int’l Crisis Group, Rwanda at the End of the Transition: A Necessary 
Political Liberalisation, at 12–13, Africa Report No. 53 (Nov. 13, 2002), available at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/files/africa/central-africa/rwanda/
rwanda%20at%20the%20end%20of%20the%20transition%20a%20necessary%20political
%20liberalisation.ashx; Reyntjens, supra note 4, at 181. 
62. See Genocide Survivors Halt Cooperation with UN Tribunal, U.N. WIRE, January 29, 
2002, http://www.unwire.org/unwire/20020129/23361_story.asp; More Witnesses Boycott 
UN Tribunal for Rwanda, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY, April 8, 2002, 
http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/7834/26; see also Letter from Antoine 
Mugesera, President, Ibuka, and Dancilla Mukandoli, President, Avega, to the ICTR 
Registrar (Mar. 6, 2002), and appendices (on file with author). 
63. Chris McGreal, Genocide Tribunal Ready to Indict First Tutsis: Rwanda is Blocking 
Investigations of Former Rebels Despite Pledges, Prosecutor Says, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 5, 
2002, at 16. 
64. See Erik Møse, Main Achievements of the ICTR, 3 INT’L J. CRIM. JUST. 920, 939 
(2005). 
65. See FIDH, supra note 16, at 5. Former ICTR President Erik Møse estimates that 
this cost the Tribunal twenty-one trial days. Møse, supra note 63, at 939. Peskin faults the 
judges for adjourning trials and thereby passing up “a critical opportunity to expose 
Rwandan non-compliance.” PESKIN, supra note 45, at 215. Rwanda also refused to 
provide access to documents needed by the prosecution. In June, survivors’ 
organizations, with government encouragement, staged a demonstration of several 
thousand protesters in front of the ICTR’s Kigali offices. Arnaud Grellier et al., Kigali-
TPIR: Le Bras de Fer [ICTR: The Showdown], June 28, 2002, http://www.rnw.nl/
international-justice/node/31255. 
66. CAROL OFF, THE LION, THE FOX AND THE EAGLE: A STORY OF GENERALS AND 
JUSTICE IN YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA 331 (2000). 
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genocide trials to ensure there would be no RPF trials, “effectively 
blackmailing” the tribunal.67 
The prosecutor informed the Security Council in July that 
Rwanda had prevented witnesses from traveling to the tribunal as 
a way of pressuring her to halt the special investigations. She 
stated, “Currently, there is no genuine political will on the part 
of the Rwandan Authorities to provide assistance in an area of 
work that they interpret to be political in nature, when, 
obviously, the prosecutor limits herself to the technical 
implementation of her judicial mandate.”68 
In response, the Rwandan government “counter-sham[ed]” 
the tribunal for corruption, incompetence, and maltreatment of 
witnesses, suggesting that those failings justified Rwanda’s 
noncompliance.69 “To thwart Del Ponte, the Rwandan 
government . . . cast the ICTR as yet another betrayal by the UN 
and the international community.”70 Rwanda also staunchly 
opposed prosecutions of RPF crimes: 
The Government of Rwanda believes that politically 
motivated pursuit of members of the RPA by the ICTR is not 
conducive to stability and national reconciliation in Rwanda. 
The Prosecutor has confessed to the Government of Rwanda 
that she has to pursue indictments against the RPA because 
she is under pressure from some states to do so. It would 
appear that the proposed indictments of the RPA are merely 
intended to appease advocates of a so-called ‘ethnically 
balanced justice’ and proponents of revisionism.71 
The prosecutor made another appeal for Security Council action 
in her annual address in October 2002: “No State can place itself 
 
67. DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 224. 
68. Id. at 227. Del Ponte’s statement underscores the absurdity of trying to divorce 
law and politics when it comes to international justice. See id. 
69. PESKIN, supra note 45, at 152. 
70. Id. Peskin argues that “Del Ponte’s greatest mistake was in not doing more to 
build international support for her investigations or to insulate the prosecutor’s office 
from Rwanda’s predictable counter-shaming offensive.” Id. at 224. While Del Ponte 
played a difficult hand badly, I am not convinced that she would have had much success 
in building international support for RPF investigations. There was simply no political 
will to confront Rwanda over the issue. 
71. Reply of the Government of Rwanda to the Report of the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to the Security Council, at 5, U.N. Doc. S/2002/842 (July 26, 
2002). 
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above its international obligations, and co-operation, even on 
sensitive issues, must be unconditional.”72 
It took nearly a year for the Security Council to finally weigh 
in with a tepid reminder that Rwanda had a legal obligation to 
cooperate with the tribunal.73 That made it clear that Rwanda 
had the upper hand.74 By that point, Del Ponte had already put 
the special investigations on hold and Rwanda had allowed the 
flow of prosecution witnesses to resume.75 The Security Council’s 
failure to respond more forcefully underscored its weak 
institutional commitment to international justice. As Ralph 
Zacklin, the U.N. Assistant Secretary General for Legal Affairs, 
pointed out: “The reality is that the ICTY and the [ICTR] were 
established more as acts of political contrition, because of 
egregious failures to swiftly confront the situations in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, than as part of a deliberate policy [of] 
promoting international justice.”76 It is no surprise, then, that the 
response to Rwanda’s contumacious behavior was political rather 
than principled. Of the Security Council’s permanent five, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and China have strong 
economic and political investments in Rwanda,77 while China and 
Russia are not strong supporters of international justice. 
 
72. Press Release, Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo. [ICTY], Address by 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, Mrs. Carla del Ponte, to the United Nations Security Council, ICTY Doc. 
JJJ/P.I.S./709-e (Oct. 30, 2002), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/8056. 
73. See S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); DEL PONTE, 
supra note 46, at 229; see also Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
art. 28(1), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute] (“States shall 
cooperate with the [ICTR] in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of 
committing serious violations of international humanitarian law.”). 
74. See PESKIN, supra note 45, at 216–17. 
75. Cruvellier and Peskin state that Del Ponte suspended the special investigations. 
CRUVELLIER, supra note 44, at 161; PESKIN, supra note 45, at 219. In her memoirs, Del 
Ponte denies this, stating that the suspension was a rumor spread by the Rwandan 
government after she withdrew her investigators from Kigali. DEL PONTE, supra note 46, 
at 229. Whether officially suspended or not, the special investigations certainly seemed 
to be put on ice. 
76. Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 541, 542 (2004). 
77. See generally U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., USAID/RWANDA INTEGRATED 
STRATEGIC PLAN 2004–2009: VOL. 1 (2004), available at http://www.usaid.gov/rw/
our_work/for_partners/usaidrwandaintegratedstrategicplan2004-2009.pdf (outlining 
U.S. commitment to Rwanda); Dep’t for Int’l Dev., Rwanda: Country Assistance Plan 
2003–2006 (2004) (U.K.), available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/
cap_rwanda.pdf (laying out U.K. commitment to Rwanda); Bosco Hitimana, China, 
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On May 15, 2003, then-U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War 
Crimes Pierre-Richard Prosper tried to broker a deal between 
Rwanda and the ICTR.78 That agreement would have given 
Rwanda the first shot at trying RPF soldiers, while allowing the 
ICTR to reassert jurisdiction if the proceedings proved to be 
flawed.79 Del Ponte argues she never made a verbal agreement, 
while others claim she did but later balked when it came to 
signing Prosper’s faxed memorial.80 As Del Ponte recalls: 
The key sentence . . . was this: “The [Office of the 
Prosecutor] will not seek an indictment or otherwise bring a 
case before the [tribunal] unless it is determined that the 
[Rwandan government’s] investigation or prosecution was 
not genuine.” This sentence is vague, unskillfully vague. Who 
is to make this determination? Upon what criteria? What is 
the definition of genuine? In my opinion, this sentence 
would have presented Rwanda with an opening to kill the 
Special Investigation and every other effort the tribunal 
might take to exercise its primacy and independence.81 
The collapse of the negotiations sparked efforts to remove 
Del Ponte as ICTR prosecutor.82 According to Del Ponte, the 
United States and the United Kingdom spearheaded her removal 
at the behest of Rwanda because of her determination to follow 
 
Rwanda Vow to Boost Trade Relations, EAST AFRICAN BUSINESS WEEK (Kampala), Jan. 19, 
2009, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200901191385.html (describing China’s 
commitment to Rwanda). 
78. See MOGHALU, supra note 43, at 144–48. 
79. See id. For Del Ponte’s version of the meeting, see DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 
231. It is somewhat ironic that the U.S. Ambassador was pushing the ICC model of 
complementarity given U.S. opposition to the ICC. 
80. Compare DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 233, with CRUVELLIER, supra note 44, at 
162. See also Pierre Prosper, Remarks at the International Symposium on the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Model or Counter Model for International 
Criminal Justice? The Perspectives of Stakeholders, Session 2: The Prosecutions 28 (July 
9, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.unictr.org/portals/0/english/news/events/
july2009/session2.pdf). 
81. DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 234. The “genuine” language here mirrors that 
found in Article 17 of the ICC Statute. See discussion infra note 234. 
82. DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 234; see also Marlise Simons, Rwanda is Said to Seek 
New Prosecutor for War Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2003, at A2. 
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through on RPF prosecutions.83 Whether correct or not, it 
certainly had that appearance.84 
What also hastened Del Ponte’s departure was the Security 
Council’s imposition of a “completion strategy” on the ICTR in 
August 2003.85 The U.N. and the tribunal’s donors had begun to 
fear that the ad hoc tribunals would become ad infinitum unless 
they were given a firm deadline to finish their work. As the 
former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes recalled: “We 
in the United States and other governments, everyone kept 
raising that question, ‘This is expensive. This is expensive.’”86 
The completion strategy set the deadlines as 2004 for 
investigations, 2008 for trials, and 2010 for appeals.87 To meet 
those deadlines, the Security Council urged the ICTR “to 
transfer cases involving intermediate- and lower-rank accused to 
competent national jurisdictions, as appropriate, including 
 
83. DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 234–39; see also MOGHALU, supra note 43, at 134–
36. 
84. See PESKIN, supra note 45, at 220–22. Cruvellier attributes Del Ponte’s 
replacement to her unrealistic plans to prosecute sizable numbers of genocide suspects 
at a time when the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States were 
eager to impose a completion strategy. Interview with Thierry Cruvellier, Geneva, Switz. 
(July 10, 2009); see also MOGHALU, supra note 43, at 133 (observing that Del Ponte was 
“initially politically tone-deaf” about the completion strategy).  
85. See S.C. Res. 1503, S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003). The ICTY had formulated the 
basic principles of its completion strategy by mid-2002. See Press Release, ICTY, Address 
by His Excellency, Judge Claude Jorda, President of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations Security Council, ICTY Doc. 
JDH/P.I.S./690-e (July 26, 2002) (calling for “prosecution and trial of the highest-
ranking political, military, paramilitary, and civilian leaders and [the referral of] certain 
cases to national courts.”). For early discussions of the completion strategy, see Laura 
Bingham, Strategy or Process? Closing the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 687 (2006) (reviewing early discussions 
of the completion strategy), and Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial Effects of the “Completion 
Strategies” on the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 142 (2005) 
(assessing the early wisdom of the completion strategies of the ICTR and ICTY). 
86. Pierre Prosper, Remarks at the International Symposium on the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Model or Counter Model for International Criminal 
Justice? The Perspectives of Stakeholders, Session 5: Debates with Prosecutors 26 (July 
11, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.unictr.org/portals/0/english/news/
events/july2009/session5.pdf) [hereinafter Debates with Prosecutors]. Writing in 2004, 
the U.N.’s Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs bluntly stated: “The ad hoc 
Tribunals have been too costly, too inefficient and too ineffective . . . . [T]hey exemplify 
an approach that is no longer politically or financially viable.” Zacklin, supra note 76, at 
545. 
87. S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 85. The deadline for the completion of trials has 
since been extended to the end of 2010. See S.C. Res 1878, ¶¶ 3–6, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1878 (July, 7. 2009). 
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Rwanda.”88 The resolution also created a separate ICTR 
prosecutor.89 This was not simply an effort to remove Del Ponte: 
there were long-standing and justifiable concerns that she and 
her predecessors had focused on the Yugoslav cases at the 
expense of the Rwanda ones. Finally, the Security Council 
reaffirmed Rwanda’s obligation “to intensify cooperation with 
and render all necessary assistance to the ICTR, including on 
investigations of the Rwandan Patriotic Army.”90 
The completion strategy made clear that international 
criminal justice is inherently political. Del Ponte stated that the 
strategy “was behind the political pressure that we have acted 
on.”91 It also underscored the limits of the ICTR’s independence. 
As the ICTR’s former deputy prosecutor caustically remarked: 
I don’t think what the Tribunals were asked to do was to 
complete their work. They said: ‘Enough is enough. We the 
politicians say you have to stop sometime.’ . . . I think we 
should get out of the illusion that we’re independent in the 
sense of deciding whether justice has been done or not. We 
probably are only independent when we are . . . doing the 
cases. But in the final analysis, the political authority tells us 
when to start, finances us, and tells us when to stop, and if we 
don’t stop, they cut off the finances and we have nothing to 
do with it.92 
Thus, the ICTR prosecutor was caught between the Security 
Council’s politics of completion and Rwanda’s politics of 
(non)cooperation. 
When Gambian Judge Hassan Bubacar Jallow took over as 
prosecutor in 2003, he knew Rwanda had successfully halted the 
special investigations and had successfully lobbied for his 
predecessor’s ouster.93 Where Del Ponte was mercurial and 
attention seeking, Jallow has been reserved and diplomatic. As 
the tribunal approached its completion date, Jallow kept people 
guessing about his intentions.94 When he finally showed his hand 
 
88. S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 85. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Carla Del Ponte, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 20. 
92. Bernard Muna, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 27–28. 
93. Reydams, supra note 54, at 978–79. 
94. See id. at 985–86 (arguing that the prosecutor had already demonstrated bias). 
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in 2008, it turned out to be the 2003 Pierre-Richard Prosper plan 
redux. 
II. “AGREEMENT” FOR A DOMESTIC RPF TRIAL 
A. Impetus for the Deal 
So why did the prosecutor and Rwanda not simply let the 
clock run out on the possibility of RPF prosecutions? There was 
certainly no pressure from the U.N. or from the United States 
and United Kingdom, which are the largest state donors to both 
the ICTR and Rwanda. Persistent “naming and shaming” from 
human rights NGOs, particularly Human Rights Watch, had 
made little headway. What put RPF prosecutions back on the 
agenda were Rwanda’s attempts to transfer genocide suspects 
from the ICTR and national jurisdictions to stand trial in 
Rwanda, along with French and Spanish indictments of the RPF. 
1. Transfers of Genocide Suspects 
As part of its completion strategy, the ICTR has sought to 
transfer cases involving “smaller fish” to national jurisdictions for 
investigation and trial. It has had only limited success because 
some states lack universal jurisdiction statutes, while others have 
not incorporated genocide into their domestic criminal code.95 
Still other states are reluctant to go to the expense of prosecuting 
suspects with tangential or non-existent links to that jurisdiction. 
So far, the only willing Western states have been Belgium, 
France, and Canada—states with historical links to Rwanda 
and/or sizable Rwandan émigré communities.96 
 
95. The ICTR prosecutor’s attempts to refer the Bagaragaza case to Norway, and 
then the Netherlands, foundered because domestic courts in both states lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over genocide. See Prosecutor v. Michel Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR 
2005-86-11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Revocation of the 
Referral to the Kingdom of the Netherlands Pursuant to Rule 11bis (F) & (G) (Aug. 17, 
2007); Prosecutor v. Michel Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR 05-86-AR11bis, Decision on Rule 
11bis Appeal (Aug. 30, 2006); see also Alhaqi Marong, The ICTR Transfers Michel 
Bagaragaza to the Netherlands for Trial, ASIL INSIGHTS (Am. Soc’y. Int’l L, Wash., D.C.), 
June 18, 2007, http://www.asil.org/insights070618.cfm. 
96. No African states, other than Rwanda, have expressed interest in genocide 
referrals from the ICTR. Author’s notes from speech by Hassan B. Jallow, 
Commonwealth Secretariat, London, Jun. 25, 2010. See Erik Møse, The ICTR’s Completion 
Strategy—Challenges and Possible Solutions, 6 J. INT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 667, 673–74 
(2008). 
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Not surprisingly, the state with the keenest interest in taking 
transfer cases was Rwanda. In an effort to make that happen, the 
Rwandan government abolished the death penalty,97 made 
judicial reforms,98 created new prison and detention facilities for 
transferred suspects,99 and enacted a new law governing 
transfers.100 Rwandan officials may also have decided to try an 
RPF case to demonstrate their justice system was robust enough 
to handle transfers.101 
To the Rwandan government’s chagrin, the designated trial 
chambers and appeals chamber ended up rejecting all five of the 
prosecutor’s motions for referral.102 Although the judges 
acknowledged significant improvements in Rwanda’s justice 
sector, they held that transferred suspects could not be 
guaranteed a fair trial, largely because defense witnesses might 
not testify for fear of being arrested under Rwanda’s sweeping 
law against “genocide ideology.”103 The judges also found that 
 
97. Organic Law No. 31/2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda (special 
ed.), July 25, 2007. A copy of the law is electronically available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/46bada1c2.html. 
98. See generally Human Rights Watch, supra note 21. 
99. See Willy Mugenzi, Mpanga Prison Ready for ICTR Transfers, Says Mutaboba, NEW 
TIMES (Kigali), Mar. 27, 2007, http://allafrica.com/stories/200703270457.html. 
100. Organic Law No. 11/2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda (special 
ed.), Mar. 19, 2007. A copy of the law is electronically available at 
http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/
Organic-Law-11-2007-Transfer-ICTR-Other-Cases-to-Rwanda.pdf. 
101. Possibly, there was a quid pro quo in which the Rwandan government agreed to 
prosecute an RPF case in exchange for the prosecutor’s efforts to transfer genocide 
cases to Rwanda. 
102. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, ICTR Case No. ICTR 01-67-R11bis, Decision on 
the Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda (Dec. 16, 
2008); Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR 00-55B-R11bis, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Appeal against Decision on Referral under Rule 11bis (Dec. 4, 2008); 
Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. ICTR 2000-61-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request 
for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (Nov. 17, 2008); Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case 
No. ICTR 2002-78-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal against Decision on Referral 
Under Rule 11bis (Oct. 30, 2008); Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR 97-36-R11bis, 
Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal against Decision on Referral under Rule 11bis 
(Oct. 8, 2008); see also Phil Clark & Nicola Palmer, The International Community Fails 
Rwanda Again 1 (Oxford Transitional Justice Research Working Paper Series, 2009), 
available at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/ClarkandPalmer_Rwanda_Final.pdf 
(critiquing this group of ICTR decisions). 
103. See, e.g., Kanyarukiga, Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal Against Decision on 
Referral Under Rule 11bis, ¶¶ 23–35; see also Law No. 18/2008, Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Rwanda, Oct. 15, 2008; Article 19, Comment on the Law Relating to the 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology of Rwanda, Sept. 2009, available at 
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transferred suspects were at risk of prolonged solitary 
confinement if convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.104 
In the wake of those rulings, Rwanda has carved out an 
exemption to the “genocide ideology” law for trial testimony, 
clarified its sentencing law, and made some improvements to 
witness protection for defense witnesses.105 The ICTR prosecutor 
has expressed his intention to file new motions for the referral of 
eight cases in September 2010.106 
Rwanda has also sought the extradition of genocide suspects 
from several European jurisdictions.107 The United Kingdom 




Lars Waldorf, Revisiting Hotel Rwanda: Genocide Ideology, Reconciliation, and Rescuers, 11 J. 
GENOCIDE RES. 101, 101–25 (2009) (describing how Rwanda’s overly broad and vague 
law on “genocide ideology” has hampered its efforts to get genocide suspects 
transferred and extradited to Rwanda); Amnesty Int’l, Easier to Remain Silent 
(forthcoming 2010). A copy of the law cited above is also electronically available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4acc9a4e2.html. 
104. See, e.g., Kanyarukiga, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision 
on Referral under Rule 11bis, ¶¶ 7, 12. 
105. See U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 (June 4, 
2009) (“[T]he Government of Rwanda . . . has enacted [] additional legislation to meet 
the remaining concerns of the Appeals Chamber in relation to the protection of 
witnesses and the recording of testimony of witnesses who may be reluctant to travel to 
Rwanda to testify. Once the law comes into force and the capacity is established for 
witness protection and video link facilities, my Office will again consider making further 
applications before the Trial Chambers in the course of this year for the referral of cases 
of ICTR indictees to Rwanda for trial.”). The ICTR prosecutor also described changes 
made to laws and practices to meet the appeals chamber’s concerns over transfers. See id. 
at 31–32; see also Organic Law 3/2009, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda 
(special ed.), May 26, 2009, at 3 (amending Organic Law No. 11/2007 concerning the 
transfer of cases to Rwanda from the ICTR). 
106. Author’s notes from speech by Hassan B. Jallow, Commonwealth Secretariat, 
London (June 25, 2010); see also Hassan B. Jallow, Chief Prosecutor, ICTR, Statement to 
the United Nations Security Council 2 (Dec. 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/default.aspx?id=1035; Hassan B. Jallow, Remarks at 
Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 43–44; Press Release, ICTR, More 
Prosecution’s Case Files Transferred to Rwanda, ICTR Doc. ICTR/INFO-9-2-639.EN 
(Jun. 8, 2010).  
107. See generally REDRESS & African Rights Conference on the Extradition of 
Rwandese Genocide Suspects to Rwanda, July 1, 2008, Brussels, Belgium, Extraditing 




2010] “A MERE PRETENSE OF JUSTICE” 1241 
Rwandan arrest warrants and a special extradition agreement.108 
The key issue in the extradition proceedings, as in the ICTR 
referral motions, was whether the suspects would be assured a 
fair trial in Rwanda. The District Judge sitting in the Westminster 
Magistrates’ Court ruled that the suspects could get a fair trial 
and ordered their extradition.109 That ruling was overturned on 
appeal. The High Court of Justice, following the ICTR decisions, 
held the suspects “would suffer a real risk of a flagrant denial of 
justice by reason of their likely inability to adduce the evidence of 
supporting witnesses.”110 The High Court also went further than 
the ICTR decisions: it expressed serious doubts about the 
Rwandan judiciary’s impartiality and independence.111 Courts in 
France, Germany, and Finland have also refused to extradite 
genocide suspects to Rwanda, citing fair trial concerns.112 The 
one exception so far has been Sweden, which granted an 
extradition request in 2009.113 
2. The French and Spanish Indictments 
The other source of pressure on Rwanda to try RPF crimes 
came from the French and Spanish arrest warrants for high-
ranking RPF officers. In November 2006, Judge Jean-Louis 
Bruguière, one of France’s most prominent investigating 
magistrates, accused President Kagame and several top-ranking 
RPF officers of shooting down former President Juvenal 
 
108. See Mark A. Drumbl, Prosecution of Genocide v. The Fair Trial Principle: Comments 
on Brown and Others v. The Government of Rwanda and the UK Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 289, 289–90 (2010). 
109. See Government of the Republic of Rwanda v. Bajinya & Others (Mag., June 6, 
2008), available at http://www.trial-ch.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/
trialwatch/rwandan4decision.pdf. 
110. Brown (Bajinya) & Others v. Government of Rwanda & Others, [2009] EWHC 
770 (Admin), [66] (appeal from the City of Westminster Magistrates Court). 
111. Id. [121]. 
112. See id. [47]; see also Finland Charges Rwandan Suspect, BBC NEWS, June 1, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8077441.stm. 
113. Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] [Supreme Court] 2009-05-26 p. 280 (Swed.), 
available at http://www.hogstadomstolen.se/domstolar/hogstadomstolen/avgoranden/
2009/2009-05-26%20%c3%96%201082-09%20beslut.pdf; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, 
GOVERNMENT DECISION: EXTRADITION TO RWANDA, Doc. JuBC2008/2175/BIRS (July 9, 
2009) (Swed.) (on file with Author). The extradition has been suspended pending a 
review by the European Court of Human Rights. Sweden Stops Extradition of Rwanda 
Genocide Suspect, AFP, July 16, 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/
ALeqM5i-2X4PpngZoIZJiLHB2xoh_bDemQ. 
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Habyarimana’s plane—the act that triggered the genocide, but 
which successive ICTR prosecutors have refused to pursue.114 
France had jurisdiction over the case because the pilots killed in 
the crash were both French. Bruguière issued arrest warrants for 
all the suspects except Kagame, who holds immunity as head of 
state.115 He also called on the ICTR to prosecute Kagame.116 The 
Rwandan government reacted fiercely; it denounced the 
indictments as political, reminded the world of France’s role in 
the genocide, expelled the French diplomatic community, and 
set up a commission that investigated France’s role during the 
genocide. Rwanda also asked the ICJ to find that France had 
violated its sovereignty and diplomatic immunities.117 The French 
indictment is problematic in that it relies heavily on testimony 
from former RPF soldiers, the most prominent of which has since 
recanted.118 Interestingly, the Rwandan government decided to 
 
114. Prosecutor Jallow recently explained why the ICTR has not investigated the 
plane crash: 
All the Prosecutors I believe have taken a similar position with regard to the 
shooting down of the aircraft, and this is that it is not a matter which falls 
within the mandate of the ICTR. We are mandated to prosecute on the three 
specific offences: Genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. And 
that particular incident does not fall or fit within any of those three offences. 
Hassan B. Jallow, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 12; DEL PONTE, 
supra note 46, at 180 (giving a similar rationale as to why she and Louise Arbour did not 
prosecute the plane crash); see also Peter Robinson & Golriz Ghahraman, Can Rwandan 
President Kagame be Held Responsible at the ICTR for the Killing of President Habyarimana? 6 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 981, 994 (2008) (arguing against ICTR prosecution despite concluding 
it may have been a war crime). But see Leila Sadat, Transjudicial Dialogue and the Rwandan 
Genocide: Aspects of Antagonism and Complementarity, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 543, 550 (2009) 
(contending that the shooting down of the plane could be a crime against humanity or 
complicity in genocide). Sadat also argues that “the ICTR could have served as a more 
neutral forum to mediate the dispute” over the downing of the plane. Id. at 550. 
However, this ignores the politics of state cooperation: Rwanda simply would not have 
permitted the ICTR to try that case. 
115. See Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original 
jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 17, 2006, Delivrance de mandats d’arrêt internationaux par le 
Juge Jean-Louis Bruguière [Deliverance of International Arrest Warrants by Judge Jean-
Louis Bruguière], Nov. 17, 2006. 
116. See id. at 61–62. 
117. Press Release, Int’l Court of Justice, The Republic of Rwanda Applies to the 
International Court of Justice in a Dispute with France (Apr. 18, 2007), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=1909&p1=6&p2=1. Unsurprisingly, 
France did not consent to International Court of Justice jurisdiction in that case. 
118. Compare LT. ABDUL JOSHUA RUZIBIZA, RWANDA: L’HISTOIRE SECRÉTE [RWANDA: 
THE SECRET HISTORY] 237–41 (Édition du Panama 2005) (accusing the RPF of shooting 
down Habyarimana’s plane), with Key Witness in Kabuye Trial Retracts Testimony, RADIO 
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challenge the French indictment head on by offering up one of 
the accused, Major Rose Kabuye, for trial in France.119 
While it was relatively easy to dismiss the French arrest 
warrants as politically motivated given the troubled history 
between France and Rwanda,120 it was more difficult to ignore the 
Spanish warrant. In February 2008, a Spanish investigating judge 
issued a lengthy indictment against forty senior RPF military 
officers.121 While the indictment names President Kagame, it 
rules out arrest while he remains head of state. The investigation 
was initially based on the deaths of nine Spaniards but the 
indictment goes well beyond that to assert universal jurisdiction 
over a range of crimes (including allegations of genocide) 
committed against Hutu in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo between 1990 and 2002.122 
The Rwandan government lambasted the Spanish 
indictment: 
Judge Fernando Andreu Merelles has never been to either 
Rwanda or the Democratic Republic of Congo to conduct 
investigations; has never interviewed the alleged suspects in 
the alleged crimes; has never liaised with judicial authorities 
in either of the two countries. He just sat in Madrid; listened 
to well-known detractors of Rwanda and based on their 
falsehoods, which he never tried to crosscheck, just went 
ahead and issued indictments . . . . Universal jurisdiction is 
 
FRANCE INT’L., Nov. 19, 2008 (recanting earlier accusations), http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/
articles/107/article_2190.asp. 
119. Chris McGreal, Top Aide to Rwandan President Agrees to Stand Trial in France over 
Genocide Claims: Detained Officer Welcomes Chance to Clear Her Name: Indictment Accused Nine 
of Killing Hutu Leader, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 11, 2008, at 16; Rwandan Returns for 
French Trial, BBC NEWS, Jan. 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7819679.stm. 
It remains to be seen how the trial will progress in light of the recent rapprochement 
between France and Rwanda. See Rwanda and France Restore Diplomatic Relations, BBC 
NEWS, Nov. 30, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8385887.stm. 
120. See DANIELA KROSLAK, THE ROLE OF FRANCE IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 
(2007); GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 281–99, 337–41 
(2d ed. 1999); ANDREW WALLIS, SILENT ACCOMPLICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF FRANCE’S 
ROLE IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE (2006). 
121. SAN, Feb. 6, 2008, Juzgado Central de instrucción no. 4: Auto [Central 
Criminal Court No. 4: Preliminary Investigation] [hereinafter Spanish Indictment], 
available at http://www.veritasrwandaforum.org/dosier/resol_auto_esp_06022008.pdf. 
For a description of the indictment, see Commentary, The Spanish Indictment of High-
Ranking Rwandan Officials, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1003, 1004–06 (2008), and Human 
Rights Watch, supra note 21, at 92–93 (2008). 
122. Spanish Indictment, supra note 121, at 2–10, 146–47. 
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not a license for any judge or other judicial officers to violate 
the basic principles of judicial conduct . . . .123 
The Rwandan Minister of Justice went further, “The fact that 
Spanish courts have universal jurisdiction to try certain offences 
committed outside their territory does not give the judge the 
right to publish a racist, negationist, and fraudulent document to 
violate another country’s sovereignty.”124 He also threatened that 
Rwanda would sue the Spanish judge as it had done to the 
French judge.125 In addition, Rwanda spearheaded a campaign 
against universal jurisdiction at the African Union.126 As a result, 
the African Union’s Assembly criticized universal jurisdiction in a 
2008 decision: “The political nature and abuse of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction by judges from some non-African States 
against African leaders, particularly Rwanda, is a clear violation of 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these States . . . .”127 
The Assembly also resolved that A.U. member states would not 
enforce arrest warrants issued under universal jurisdiction.128 
These two indictments may well have increased pressure on 
both the ICTR prosecutor and the Rwandan government to be 
seen to act on RPF crimes. In particular, the Spanish arrest 
warrant named Wilson Gumisiriza, one of the two commanding 
officers in the clergy massacre that had been a primary focus of 
the ICTR’s special investigations. By finally trying Gumisiriza and 
three other officers for that massacre, the Rwandan government 
 
123. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COOPERATION, COMMUNIQUE: RWANDA 
GOVERNMENT REACTION TO THE SPANISH JUDGE INDICTMENTS (2008) (emphasis 
omitted), available at http://www.rwandaembassy-japan.org/en/themes/rwanda/
rwanda_images/whatsnew/Communique.pdf. 
124. James Munyaneza, Govt Dismisses Spanish Judge’s Indictments, NEW TIMES 
(Kigali), Feb. 9, 2008, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=13435&article=4069 
(quoting the Minister of Justice). 
125. Felly Kimenyi, Rwanda Ponders Suing Spanish Judge Merelles, NEW TIMES 
(Kigali), May 1, 2008, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=13517&article=5992 
(quoting the Minister of Justice). 
126. See Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction, supra note 47, ¶ 1. 
127. Id. ¶ 5(ii). 
128. Id. ¶ 5(iv). The difficulties faced by universal jurisdiction in Africa are 
exemplified by Senegal’s reluctance to try former Chadian dictator, Hissène Habré. See 
Reed Brody, The Prosecution of Hissène Habré: International Accountability, National 
Impunity, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH 
VERSUS JUSTICE 278, 278–300 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006); 
Human Rights Watch, The Case Against Hissène Habré, an “African Pinochet,” 
http://www.hrw.org/en/habre-case (last visited Mar. 2, 2010). 
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bolstered its argument that the French and Spanish arrest 
warrants were the latest manifestation of Western neo-
colonialism toward Africa. It also strengthened Rwanda’s case in 
the Spanish courts as those courts cannot exercise universal 
jurisdiction where the state involved has effectively investigated 
and prosecuted the case itself.129 
B. ICTR-Rwanda Agreement 
On June 4, 2008, the ICTR prosecutor informed the U.N. 
Security Council that Rwanda would prosecute the clergy 
massacre that his office had investigated. He assured the Security 
Council that the decision was made “on the clear understanding 
that any such prosecutions in and by Rwanda should be effective, 
expeditious, fair and open to the public.”130 He also pledged that 
his office would monitor the Rwandan proceedings and reassert 
its primacy if the proceedings proved to be unsatisfactory.131 A 
week later, four Rwandan officers were arrested.132 The 
prosecutor subsequently provided further details about his 
agreement with Rwanda. He claimed he had sufficient evidence 
to indict the four suspects and then explained his rationale for 
allowing Rwanda to try the suspects: 
The Rwandans wanted to be given the opportunity to 
prosecute the case, and I did agree with that position. 
Essentially, on the basis that if the Rwandan government can 
be made to indict and prosecute and effectively and fairly 
prosecute people who are seen to be as part of its 
establishment, it has the potential to make a bigger 
contribution to national reconciliation if the cases can be 
dealt with effectively at that level.133 
The prosecutor later likened his decision to his earlier transfer of some 
30 investigative files on genocide suspects to Rwanda.134 
 
129. See Commentary, supra note 121, at 1008. 
130. U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5904th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5904 (June 4, 
2008). 
131. Id. 
132. See Kennedy Ndahiro, Four RDF Officers Arrested, NEW TIMES (Kigali), June 12, 
2008, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=13559&article=7042. 
133. See Hassan B. Jallow, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 
13. 
134. See Letter from Hassan B. Jallow, Chief Prosecutor, ICTR, to Kenneth Roth, 
Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, OTP/2009/P/084 (June 22, 2009) 
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From the outset, a domestic trial was a completely 
inappropriate substitute for ICTR prosecutions. For the previous 
fourteen years, the RPF-led government had shown a marked 
unwillingness to prosecute any RPF crimes.135 Furthermore, a 
week before the prosecutor’s announcement, an ICTR trial 
chamber ruled that Rwanda could not provide fair trials in high-
profile genocide cases—cases that are much less politically 
sensitive than an RPF trial.136 
1. The 1994 Clergy Massacre 
Of the thirteen investigative files opened by the special 
investigations,137 the clergy massacre was the obvious choice for 
Rwanda to prosecute. First, it was the most notorious RPF 
massacre as it involved the slaying of an archbishop, three 
bishops, and nine clergy.138 Second, its very notoriety and its 
small scale (fifteen victims in total) made it look unique, and 
thus harder to contend that it constituted a crime against 
humanity.139 The massacres in Butare and Giti, which had also 
 
[hereinafter June 22, 2009 Letter from Jallow to Roth], available at http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/related_material/2009_06_Rwanda_Jallow_Response_0.pdf. In June 
2010, the Prosecutor referred another twenty-five genocide investigative files to Rwanda. 
See Press Release, ICTR, supra note 106. The prosecutor does not require a court order 
to refer investigations that have not reached the indictment stage. Cf. ICTR, Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, R. 11 bis (Feb. 9, 2010) [hereinafter ICTR Rules], available at 
http://www.unictr.org/portals/0/english\legal\rop\100209.pdf (requiring an order of 
the trial chamber for referral of indictments). 
135. As Human Rights Watch stated: 
We, too, believe that domestic prosecutions are better at fighting impunity 
than international trials because they involve the local population in the 
judicial process and can have a larger impact on affected communities. Yet the 
Government of Rwanda has a strong incentive not to pursue senior RPF 
officials who directed crimes in 1994—many of whom may be currently senior 
government or military officials. Unfortunately, the choice is not between 
international and domestic justice but between international justice and 
impunity. 
Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to Hassan B. 
Jallow, Chief Prosecutor, ICTR, at 3 (Aug. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Aug. 14, 2009 Letter 
from Roth to Jallow], available at http://www.hrw.org/node/85068. 
136. See Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR 97-36-R11bis, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda (May 28, 2008). 
137. The special investigations quickly narrowed the focus to three dossiers. DEL 
PONTE, supra note 46, at 182, 184. 
138. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 714. 
139. See ICTR Statute, supra note 73, art. 3 (indicating that crimes against humanity 
must involve widespread or systematic attacks against civilians); see also, e.g., Prosecutor v. 
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been the focus for the special investigations,140 were more clearly 
part of a widespread or systematic attack on Hutu civilians. This is 
particularly true of Giti, which is well known for being one of the 
few places in Rwanda where genocide did not occur141—though 
that was not enough to prevent retaliatory massacres by the RPF. 
Third, a trial would give the Rwandan government an 
opportunity to put the victims—in this case, the Catholic Church 
hierarchy—on trial for its role during the genocide.142 Finally, a 
trial would help blunt the Spanish proceedings as one of the 
defendants was already subject to a Spanish arrest warrant.143 
The basic facts of the massacre have been public for years. 
From exile, a Rwandan priest published an account on the 
internet in 1999.144 That same year, Des Forges described the 
massacre in Leave None: 
 
Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 2165 (Dec. 18, 2008) 
(same). 
140. See CRUVELLIER, supra note 44, at 161. 
141. See SCOTT A. STRAUS, THE ORDER OF GENOCIDE: RACE, POWER, AND WAR IN 
RWANDA 85–87 (2006). 
142. The RPF blames the Catholic Church for sowing the seeds of genocide and for 
actively participating in the genocide. Tom Ndahiro, a former Commissioner of the 
government’s National Human Rights Commission, has espoused this position. See Tom 
Ndahiro, The Church’s Blind Eye to Genocide in Rwanda, in GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: 
COMPLICITY OF THE CHURCHES? 229 (Carol Rittner et al. eds., 2004). The Rwandan 
government put Bishop Augustin Misago on trial in 1999. See Mgbako et al., supra note 
42, at 26. Even though he was acquitted, members of the government continue to speak 
as if the Bishop was guilty. See id. at 27. In more recent years, the government has 
accused various Catholic churches of promoting what it calls genocide ideology. See id. 
at 19–22, 25–26. The tension between the Catholic Church and the RPF quickly 
resurfaced with this trial: 
After the arrest of the suspects, the current Archbishop of Kigali, 
Thaddée Ntihinyurwa, told BBC that he feared government interference in 
the case. 
During his monthly press briefing last week in Kigali, the Rwandan 
President Paul Kagame said he was astonished to hear such a statement from 
the clergyman, who was himself the object of investigations on his alleged role 
in the 1994 genocide. 
Rwanda/Justice: Court Remand Soldier-Killers of Rwandan Catholic Clergymen, HIRONDELLE 
NEWS AGENCY (Arusha), Jun. 26, 2008 http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/
11228/516. For the most balanced accounts of the Catholic Church’s role during the 
genocide, see TIM LONGMAN, CHRISTIANITY AND GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (2009), and 
SIBOMANA, supra note 22, at 121–36. 
143. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 21, at 94. 
144. See Vénuste Linguyeneza, Témoignage Abbé Vénuste Linguyeneza Sur L’assassinat 
des Evêques à Gakurazo [Evidence from Vénuste Linguyeneza on the Assassination of Bishops at 
Gakurazo], RWANDA TRIBUNE, Dec. 2, 1999, available at http://ndagijimana.rmc.fr/
336538/temoignage-abbe-venuste-linguyeneza-sur-l-assassinat-des-eveques-a-gakurazo. 
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The one priest who survived the attack related that the group 
of clergy were arrested by the RPF at Kabgayi and moved to 
[Gakurazo,] Byimana on June 2. Several days later [on June 
5] soldiers who were guarding the clergy burst into the room 
where they were gathered and shot them dead. The priest 
who managed to flee was later captured by RPF soldiers who 
agreed to release him only after he accepted their version of 
events, that is, that the soldiers carried out the killings in 
reprisal for the slaughter of their own families.145 
The revenge killings explanation struck some scholars and 
clergy as implausible because the massacred clergy had saved 
many Tutsi at Kabgayi.146 Although Archbishop Vincent 
Nsengiyumva was a close associate of President Habyarimana, 
Bishop Thaddée Nsengiyumva was a well-known progressive who 
had tried to distance the church from the President.147 Prunier 
suggests that the clergy were deliberately killed to prevent them 
from playing a role in mediating an end to the war and 
genocide—something that would have deprived the RPF of total 
victory.148 In her memoirs, Del Ponte also recalled doubting the 
official line, “I was skeptical. These victims, including the highest-
ranking churchmen in Rwanda, were held for four days, long 
enough for high-ranking commanders of a well-disciplined 
militia to know of their capture and whereabouts, long enough 
for the killings to have been pre-meditated or ordered from 
above.”149 As discussed below, Rwanda’s trial of the massacre 
merely served to reinforce the official narrative. 
Even though the clergy massacre was “[t]he most widely 
known and condemned of executions by RPF soldiers,”150 the 
RPF did not prosecute the perpetrators until fourteen years later. 
In 1999, Des Forges wrote: 
When the RPF officially admitted responsibility for the 
slayings several days later, it declared that one of the 
murderers had been killed in flight and that the others were 
 
145. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 714. For another (second-hand) account of the 
massacre, see RUZIBIZA, supra note 118, at 303–09. 
146. See PRUNIER, supra note 120, at 271. 
147. See DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 43–44, 714; PRUNIER, supra note 120, at 270–
72; SIBOMANA, supra note 22, at 74–75. 
148. PRUNIER, supra note 120, at 271–72. Sibomana found this explanation “more 
convincing.” SIBOMANA, supra note 22, at 74–75. 
149. DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 178. 
150. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 714. 
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being sought and would be tried. Apparently none was ever 
caught and RPF authorities have never made public any 
proof to substantiate their claim that the slayings were 
unauthorized reprisal killings.151 
During the 2008 trial, it became clear that those responsible for 
the massacre and their commanding officers had been clearly 
identified by 1998,152 but that did not prevent them from 
continuing their military service—and even getting promoted.153 
2. 2008 Trial and 2009 Appeal 
The Rwandan military prosecutor drafted the indictment 
based on evidence gathered by his office. That indictment was 
approved by the ICTR prosecutor’s office, which contends that it 
did not share any of its evidence with Rwanda.154 The military 
court proceedings, which ran intermittently from June 17 to 
October 27, 2008, opened with guilty pleas from the two lower-
ranking officers, Captain John Butera and retired Captain 
Dieudonne Rukeba, and ended with the acquittals of the two 
higher-ranking officers, General Wilson Gumisiriza and Major 
Wilson Ukwishaka.155 
At trial, Captains Butera and Rukeba testified that they had 
agreed to help a fellow soldier, Sergeant Déo Nyagatare, avenge 
 
151. Id. Prunier offered a more scathing assessment: 
The killers were said to have been one, two or three according to different 
versions of the event. One was shot on the spot by the Bishops’ bodyguards 
(although they “had not been able to prevent the massacre”—they cannot 
have been very efficient bodyguards since machine-gunning fifteen people 
takes some time) and the others, if they ever existed, vanished into thin air, in 
spite of the [Rwandan Patriotic] Front saying they were “actively sought after 
and would be tried.” 
PRUNIER, supra note 120, at 271 n. 117. 
152. The military interviewed several participants and witnesses in 1997 and 1998. 
Trial Observation Notes by Anonymous, in Kigali, Rwanda (Aug. 19, 2008) (on file with 
author). This Author promised anonymity to the trial observers. 
153. Both sergeants who took part in the killings were later promoted to captain. 
The commanding officers, a major and a captain, were later promoted to brigadier 
general and major, respectively. Trial Observation Notes by Anonymous, in Kigali, 
Rwanda (Aug. 20, 2008) (on file with author).  
154. See June 22, 2009 Letter from Jallow to Roth, supra note 134; Hassan B. Jallow, 
Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 13. 
155. Le Tribunal Militaire (Kigali) [Military Tribunal], No. RP 0151/08/TM, Oct. 
24, 2008 (Gumisiriza, Trial Judgment), ¶¶ 13, 196–97 (Rwanda) (on file with Author). 
These were the defendants’ ranks at the time of trial. For their ranks at the time of the 
massacre, see supra note 153. 
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his Tutsi family members, who were allegedly killed while under 
the care of the bishops at Kabgayi.156 Captain Butera explained 
his participation with reference to the Church’s alleged 
complicity in the genocide, “Everywhere we went, we never failed 
to find corpses in the churches. We also found people who were 
in agony in those churches, but we also found clergy who were in 
their parishes without doing anything to save these people in 
danger.”157 He claimed to have acted without thinking, “I fired 
like a crazy person. When our friend asked us for help, I had a 
shock in my head. And when I remembered all that I had seen in 
those churches, I lost all control and I fired . . . .”158 According to 
Butera and Rukeba’s defense, they acted without premeditation 
in response to provocation (i.e., the clergy’s role in the 
genocide).159 
The key issue at trial was whether General Gumisiriza and 
Major Ukwishaka should bear command responsibility for their 
subordinates’ acts.160 The prosecutor insisted they knew, or 
should have known, that the clergy were in danger, but failed to 
take reasonable steps to protect them.161 The prosecutor pointed 
to evidence that, when the clergy were being transported to 
Gakurazo, a crowd of displaced genocide survivors booed them, 
shouting “See the Interahamwe [the genocidal militia]!”162 Major 
Ukwishaka admitted hearing this, but said he did not take it 
seriously because he had no reason to think his own troops would 
 
156. Trial Observation Notes (Aug. 19, 2008), supra note 152, at 9–10, 12. They 
were joined by a fourth soldier, Eugène Kabandana, who was apparently shot while 
fleeing the massacre. Gumisiriza, Trial Judgment, ¶ 22. Deo Nyagatare, who allegedly 
instigated the massacre, appears to have died some time later. 
157. Trial Observation Notes (Aug. 19, 2008), supra note 152, at 12. 
158. Id. at 10. 
159. Id. at 9–11. 
160. The trial was marked by debates over the applicability of international 
humanitarian law, particularly the Geneva Conventions and the two Additional 
Protocols. Trial Observation Notes (Aug. 20, 2008), supra note 153, at 23–28. This was 
noteworthy because earlier prosecutions of RPF killings had studiously avoided the law 
and language of war crimes. 
161. Id. at 14–16. The ICTR Appeals Chamber has stated that “[t]he ‘reason to 
know’ standard is met when the accused had ‘some general information in his 
possession, which would put him on notice of possible unlawful acts by his 
subordinates.’” Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-
A, Judgment, ¶ 791 (Nov. 28, 2007). On command responsibility generally, see 
ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GÖRAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 257–71 (2008). 
162. Trial Observation Notes (Aug. 20, 2008), supra note 153, at 16. 
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commit vengeance.163 General Gumisiriza testified he could not 
have foreseen such a risk to the clergy: “I could not avoid this 
incident because I could not know what someone who wants to 
kill thinks especially when he said nothing to me about what he 
thought of doing. I could not even premeditate that this incident 
was going to happen given that, above all, we had never known 
such an incident since the war broke out [in October 1990].”164 
He also stated that he was some ten to fourteen kilometers away 
when the massacre occurred, that he immediately ordered an 
investigation, and that he had Major Ukwishaka (temporarily) 
arrested as part of that investigation.165 Responding to a question 
from the presiding judge, he claimed that “Our soldiers had 
been well trained well in advance on humanitarian law. I also had 
confidence in them, especially seeing as we had never known a 
violation of humanitarian law anywhere we had been.”166 
Gumisiriza’s defense lawyer also stressed the General had not, 
and could not have, known the clergy were at risk because 
“killing civilians was not a generalized practice within the 
[RPF].”167 
The military prosecutor presented four prosecution 
witnesses: a soldier and a young woman who were inside the hall 
when the massacre occurred, and a soldier and clergyman who 
were outside the hall. The clergyman testified that the murdered 
clergy came to Gakurazo voluntarily because it had water, 
hygiene and more security than Ruhango.168 He also praised 
Gumisiriza and Ukwishaka for their compassionate investigation 
of the massacre.169 The young woman who took the stand was 
serving a seventeen-year sentence for involvement in the 
genocide.170 She testified that she did not see the killers and that 
the RPF soldiers had given them a sense of security.171 The two 
soldiers who testified had been serving under Ukwishaka’s 
command at the time. Their testimony added very little: they 
 
163. Id. at 15. 
164. Id. at 18. 
165. Id. at 18, 19, 29. 
166. Id. at 20. 
167. Id. at 29. 
168. Trial Observation Notes by Anonymous, in Kigali, Rwanda 41–42 (Sep. 2, 
2008) (on file with author).  
169. Id. at 41. 
170. Id. at 44. 
171. Id. 
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were unable to identify the killers and did not provide any 
information related to the issue of Ukwishaka’s command 
responsibility.172 
The two captains who pled guilty presented eight witnesses 
to support their defense of provocation. Those witnesses testified 
about the Catholic Church’s complicity in the genocide and 
about the role allegedly played by some of the murdered 
clergy.173 The defense offered no evidence, however, that 
Sergeant Déo Nyagatare’s family had actually been killed at 
Kabgayi while under the protection of these clergy. The two 
commanding officers, Gumisiriza and Ukwishaka, testified in 
their own defense, but did not call any witnesses to corroborate 
their claims. 
Overall, the prosecution case was quite weak. First, the 
prosecution witnesses might just as well have testified for the 
defense. Indeed, General Ukwishaka invoked the testimony of 
the prosecution witnesses in his defense.174 Second, the 
prosecutor rarely challenged the defendants’ version of events. 
Third, the prosecutor introduced evidence that the massacre had 
not been planned in advance. Rather than questioning why the 
RPF had moved the clergy to the remote hamlet of Gakurazo 
away from international scrutiny, the prosecutor repeatedly 
stressed that the clergy themselves had requested the move to 
Gakurazo for their safety and well-being.175 Finally, the 
prosecutor failed to make a convincing case for command 
responsibility. He could have done so by presenting evidence that 
RPF commanders were on notice that their soldiers were killing 
civilians. In fact, he could have argued that this was not the first 
time that RPF soldiers had deliberately targeted members of the 
Catholic clergy; in April 1994, they killed a Spanish priest 
(Joaquín Valmajo) and three Rwandan priests (Joseph Hitimana, 
Faustin Mulindwa, and Fidéle Mulinda).176 Not surprisingly, the 
military prosecutor chose not to go down that particular route. 
Consequently, the military court acquitted the two 
commanding officers. It found they had no reason to suspect 
 
172. Id. at 46. 
173. Le Tribunal Militaire (Kigali) [Military Tribunal], No. RP 0151/08/TM, Oct. 
24, 2008 (Gumisiriza, Trial Judgment), ¶¶ 89–117 (Rwanda) (on file with Author). 
174. See id. ¶ 128. 
175. See id. ¶¶ 18–19. 
176. See DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 711. 
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their subordinates might kill the clergy.177 The court rejected the 
military prosecutor’s claim that the officers should have taken 
precautions because of the Tutsi refugees’ insults against the 
clergy.178 The court repeatedly stressed that this massacre was 
unique: 
The military prosecutor states moreover that the must 
have known standard is based on the nature of the crime 
having “widespread occurrence and notoriety” . . . . 
. . . Both parties in this trial agree on the fact that there 
were not other massacres [of this nature] any place where 
these soldiers had been. 
On this point, this case is distinguished from those of 
Yamashita and Celebici because, in those two cases, the 
crimes were committed over time and space (were 
widespread and notorious) so the commander must have 
known they had been committed (presumption of 
knowledge).. . . . 
. . . [T]hese massacres were committed by surprise and 
it was the first time that such acts occurred . . . .179 
Thus, this acquittal, like the military prosecutor’s case, rests on 
the falsehood that RPF soldiers had not already committed 
similar massacres throughout Rwanda in 1994. In addition, the 
court focused on the knowledge element and failure to prevent, 
but said nothing about the failure to punish. The judgment (and 
lawyers) cited several scholarly articles on command 
responsibility and ICTY judgments,180 but there was no reference 
to ICTR case law. 
As for the two subordinates, the court rejected their defense 
of provocation on the grounds that they had no links to the 
murdered clergy (specifically, none of their family members had 
been injured by those clergy).181 The court found them guilty of 
murder in violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions and the Rwandan Penal Code,182 but the court 
found several mitigating factors—their guilty pleas, the lack of 
 
177. Gumisiriza, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 150–64. 
178. Id. ¶¶ 154, 158, 163. 
179. Id. ¶¶ 154–56, 159 (translation provided by Author). 
180. Id. ¶¶ 30, 56–59, 75, 131–32, 136-138, 151, 156–57, 174, 180.  
181. Id. ¶ 165–66. 
182. Id. ¶ 167. 
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premeditation, the absence of prior criminal records, and other 
circumstances, such as the corpses they had seen in churches—
and sentenced them to eight years each.183 
In late February 2009, a military appeals court upheld the 
acquittals and reduced the sentences against both confessed 
soldiers from eight to five years.184 With respect to command 
responsibility, the appeals court ruled that “A person can only be 
punished/sentenced only if there is clear and undoubtedly 
evidence of notoriety and widespread nature of any kind of crime 
to be committed; in this case there was no way how the two 
commanders would have known that their subordinates were 
going to commit a crime.”185 
3. ICTR Prosecutor’s Review 
Prosecutor Jallow had promised the Security Council his 
office would monitor the proceedings so he could reassert 
jurisdiction if they were not “effective” or “fair.”186 Yet, as Human 
Rights Watch reported, the prosecutor “sent an observer for only 
two preliminary detention hearings, one trial day, closing 
arguments and the verdict. That cursory presence did not 
constitute diligent monitoring.”187 
Although the appeals judgment was handed down in 
February 2009, Jallow maintained a studied silence about the trial 
until questioned by members of the Security Council on June 4, 
2009.188 At that point, he finally stated: 
 
183. Id. ¶ 168–69. 
184. De la Haute Cour Militaire [High Military Court], No. RPA 0062/08/HCM, 
Feb. 25, 2009 (Gumisiriza, Appeal Judgment), ¶¶ 89–117 (Rwanda) (on file with 
Author); see also Edwin Musoni, Gumisiriza Wins Appeal, NEW TIMES (Kigali) Feb. 26, 
2009, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=13818&article=13710.  
185. Gumisiriza et al., Appeal Judgment, ¶ 42. 
186. U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5904th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5904 (June 4, 
2008). 
187. Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch to 
Hassan B. Jallow, Chief Prosecutor, ICTR (May 26, 2009) [hereinafter May 26, 2009 
Letter from Roth to Jallow], available at http://www.hrw.org/node/83536. The 
prosecutor disputed this contention. See June 22, 2009 Letter from Jallow to Roth, supra 
note 134; Aug. 14, 2009 Letter from Roth to Jallow, supra note 135. 
188. See U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 11–13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 (June 
4, 2009). The prosecutor made no mention of the RPF trial during his oral statement. 
Id. The questions were raised by representatives of the United States and Costa Rica. Id. 
at 27–28. 
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Regarding the matter of allegations against the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), we of course recognize that 
this is a matter that falls within our mandate, and we have 
been investigating those allegations with the result that, last 
year, we were able to reach an understanding with the 
Rwandans, who wanted to prosecute the case that we had 
developed . . . . 
. . . [W]e gave the Rwandan prosecuting authorities the 
opportunity to proceed with that case against four senior 
military officers for the killings of those clergy and other 
civilians . . . . The report of my monitors indicates that the 
standards of fair trial were observed . . . .189 
Revealingly, Jallow still referred to RPF crimes as 
“allegations” even after the two captains had confessed and been 
convicted of participating in the clergy massacre. The prosecutor 
later elaborated that “the trial had been open, public, free and 
fair.”190 He contended that the evidence introduced at trial was 
“consistent with what we have and with the position that we had 
taken.”191 He noted that the RPF officers were charged with 
violations of the Geneva Conventions.192 He then continued, “We 
should not simply say because people have been acquitted, the 
trial wasn’t fair. I mean, a fair trial clearly has the potential for 
acquittals and for convictions. So it’s not really the outcome 
which is the critical factor. It’s the process . . . .”193  
Initially, Jallow told the Security Council that the Rwandan 
proceedings would have to be “effective, expeditious, fair and 
open,”194 but in his June 2009 response to the Security Council, 
he stated only that the trial had been fair without ever 
mentioning whether it had been effective.195 The real issue is not 
about the trial’s process or fairness, but rather about its 
genuineness. A trial can be procedurally fair in that it observes 
international human rights norms, but still be inadequate. This is 
reflected in the ICTR statute, which permits the ICTR to try a 
 
189. Id. at 33. 
190. Hassan B. Jallow, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 14. 
191. Id. at 13. 
192. Id. at 14. 
193. Id. 
194. U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5904th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5904 (June 4, 
2008). 
195. U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 (June 4, 
2009). 
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suspect already tried domestically for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, or war crimes if “[t]he national court proceedings 
were not impartial or independent, were designed to shield the 
accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case 
was not diligently prosecuted.”196 
In fact, there are serious doubts about both the fairness and 
genuineness of this trial. First, Rwanda’s military courts are not 
independent and impartial, and there is little transparency about 
their functioning and performance. Even the civil courts, where 
donors focused their rule of law efforts, remain subject to 
executive influence, particularly in politically sensitive cases.197 
Consequently, the U.K. High Court of Justice expressed serious 
doubts about the Rwandan judiciary’s independence and 
impartiality.198 Second, Rwanda did not “diligently prosecute” 
the clergy massacre. The military prosecutor called only four 
prosecution witnesses, each of whom gave testimony favorable to 
the defendants and their version of events. This was hardly 
surprising; after all, the ICTR chambers and U.K. High Court 
 
196. ICTR Statute, supra note 73, art. 9(2)(b). 
197. The U.S. State Department raised concerns about judicial independence in its 
human rights report for 2008: 
[T]he judiciary operated in most cases without government interference; 
however, there were constraints on judicial independence. Government 
officials sometimes attempted to influence individual cases, primarily in gacaca 
cases. There were reports that some members of the executive branch 
considered it appropriate to call judges to discuss ongoing cases privately and 
to express executive preferences. 
During the year the country passed a constitutional amendment that 
reduces most judicial appointments from life to four or five years, potentially 
limiting judicial independence. 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2008 (2009), 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119019.htm. In its report for 
2009, the State Department raised similar concerns while recognizing that “[u]nlike in 
previous years, there were no reports that members of the executive branch called 
judges to discuss ongoing cases privately and to express executive preferences.” U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2009 (2010), available 
at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135971.htm. See also Human Rights 
Watch, supra note 21, at 44–69; Lars Waldorf, A Justice ‘Trickle-Down’: Rwanda’s First 
Postgenocide President on Trial, in PROSECUTING HEADS OF STATE 151, 151–75 (Ellen L. 
Lutz & Caitlin Reiger eds., 2009) (describing the unfair trial of former President Pasteur 
Bizimungu and his co-accused). But see Sam Rugege, Judicial Independence in Rwanda, 19 
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 411, 423 (2006) (claiming that “Rwanda has a 
government that respects the principle of the rule of law and that does not interfere in 
the judicial tasks of the courts”). 
198. Brown (Bajinya) & Others v. Government of Rwanda & Others, [2009] EWHC 
770 (Admin), [119], [121]. 
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found a real likelihood that witnesses in Rwanda would be too 
fearful to give exculpatory testimony for genocide suspects—
something that is much less politically sensitive than accusing 
RPF soldiers of war crimes. Finally, the two sentences handed 
down in this case do not reflect the gravity of the crimes 
committed, though they are consistent with the light sentences 
given to RPF soldiers convicted of murder.199  
Human Rights Watch, which monitored the trial, released a 
damning assessment: 
The trial proved to be a political whitewash and a 
miscarriage of justice . . . . Both the prosecution and the 
defense presented the killings as spontaneous reactions by 
soldiers overcome with grief for their fellow RPF officers who 
had lost relatives in the genocide. The court heard testimony 
only from witnesses supporting this version of events . . . .200 
Human Rights Watch also directly challenged the 
prosecutor’s endorsement of the evidence presented at that trial: 
We question your statement that your office does not 
possess evidence showing that the Kabgayi killings were a 
planned military operation. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [W]e gave you specific names of senior RPF officers 
whom we believed were involved in both the ordering and 
the execution of the killings. Through this evidence, we laid 
out a compelling argument that calls into question the 
Rwandan prosecution’s theory that the killings were 
spontaneous acts by low-level soldiers and shows instead that 
this was an attempt to cover up responsibility for a planned 
military operation.201 
When prosecutor Jallow was publicly confronted by Human 
Rights Watch at a July 2009 conference, he responded: “All you 
have given us is your . . . own interpretation of the evidence, and 
it differs from [our] interpretation, and we are not bound by 
 
199. Human Rights Watch, supra note 21, 104–09. 
200. May 26, 2009 Letter from Roth to Jallow, supra note 184. 
201. Aug. 14, 2009 Letter from Roth to Jallow, supra note 135, at 2–3. For a fuller 
description of the evidence that was not presented at trial, see Leslie Haskell & Lars 
Waldorf, The ICTR’s Impunity Gap: Causes and Consequences (forthcoming) (manuscript at 
13–14, on file with author). 
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your own interpretation.”202 Former prosecutor Del Ponte also 
disputed Jallow’s positive assessment of the trial: 
[T]hey have been acquitted—that is the confirmation that 
shows that Rwanda did not want to do these cases. For me, 
it’s the proof . . . that they are not able and they are not 
willing. I heard that myself directly from President Kagame. 
He told me at that time that they would not do them. This 
confirms that.203 
III. LARGER ISSUES 
A. Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecutorial Independence 
The prosecutor exercised his prosecutorial discretion over 
the clergy massacre at three critical junctures. First, he decided 
not to indict the four RPF officers. Had he indicted them, then 
his referral of the case would have required judicial approval.204 
However, a trial chamber had already rejected one of the 
prosecutor’s motions to refer the less sensitive genocide cases.205 
Second, he allowed Rwanda to try the case despite the ICTR’s 
primacy.206 Finally, he determined the Rwandan trial was fair and 
thus did not need to take back the case.207 
The prosecutor has wide discretion whether or not to 
prosecute. While indictments must be reviewed by a trial 
chamber,208 there is no direct mechanism for reviewing a 
decision not to indict.209 The only avenue to challenge this is 
indirectly through a defense of selective prosecution. Several 
ICTR defendants have tried this, arguing that the prosecutor has 
only prosecuted one side of the Rwandan conflict and that 
virtually all the defendants are Hutu. This argument, which 
 
202. Hassan B. Jallow, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 46. 
203. Carla Del Ponte, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 22–23 
(translation provided by author). 
204. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
205. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
206. See supra notes 129–34 and accompanying text. 
207. See supra notes 186–92 and accompanying text. 
208. See ICTR Statute, supra note 73, art. 18(1). The prosecutor does not require 
judicial authorization in order to open an investigation, as happens at the ICC. Jallow, 
supra note 94, at 147. Compare ICTR Statute, supra note 73, art. 17, with Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court art. 53, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Rome Statute]. 
209. See Reydams, supra note 54, at 983. 
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smacks of a tu quoque defense, has been uniformly rejected.210 
Early on, the ICTR appeals chamber made clear that the 
defendant has to do more than allege discriminatory effect; he 
also must prove an unlawful or improper (i.e., discriminatory) 
intent with respect to his own prosecution.211 It is particularly 
difficult for a defendant to make that showing where there 
already exists a prima facie case against him.212 
In response to the completion strategy imposed by the 
Security Council, the ICTR prosecutor published his criteria for 
exercising prosecutorial discretion in 2004: 
In determining which individuals should be subject to trial 
before the [ICTR], the Prosecutor will be guided by the need 
to focus on those who are alleged to have been in positions 
of leadership and those who, according to the Prosecutor, 
bear the greatest responsibility for genocide. This 
concentration on the most senior leaders suspected of being 
most responsible for the crimes committed within the 
jurisdiction of the [ICTR] is in conformity with Security 
Council resolution 1534 (2004). The criteria taken into 
consideration when making this determination are as 
follows: 
 the alleged status and extent of participation of 
the individual during the genocide 
 the alleged connection an individual may have 
with other cases 
 the need to cover the major geographical areas of 
Rwanda in which crimes were allegedly committed 
 the availability of evidence with regard to the 
individual concerned 
 the concrete possibility of arresting the individual 
concerned 
 
210. See Jallow, supra note 94, at 155. 
211. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 94–96 (June 1, 
2001); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR 96-10-I & ICTR 96-17-T, Judgment 
and Sentence, ¶¶ 870–71 (Feb. 21, 2003); see also Jallow, supra note 94, 155–59 
(summarizing this case law). 
212. See Jallow, supra note 94, at 160. 
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 the availability of investigative material for 
transmission to a State for national prosecution.213 
What is most striking about these criteria is that they only refer to 
genocide cases. This is consistent with the Prosecutor’s decision 
to ignore Security Council resolution 1503’s call for Rwandan 
cooperation on RPF crimes.214 
The prosecutor’s criteria have altered over the years.215 The 
most significant change came in 2005 when the prosecutor 
added national reconciliation: “National reconciliation is 
anticipated to be an important outcome of the prosecution 
process. Hence, the extent to which the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion impacts on this objective—positively or adversely—is a 
relevant consideration.”216 The prosecutor’s reference to national 
reconciliation is rooted in Security Council Resolution 955, 
which created the ICTR. That Resolution optimistically 
proclaimed “the prosecution of persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law . . . would contribute 
to the process of national reconciliation.”217 However, there is no 
reference to “national reconciliation” anywhere in the ICTR 
Statute itself. 
 
213. President, ICTR, Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Letter Dated 30 April 2004 from the President of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of 
Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighbouring States between 1 Jan. and 31 Dec. 1994 addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, Annex, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. S/2004/341 (May 3, 2004). In a 2005 article, 
the former Chief of Prosecutions at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, who had 
previously served in the ICTR Prosecutor’s office, criticized the ICTR and ICTY 
Prosecutors for exercising their discretion without sufficient transparency. Luc Côté, 
Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law, 3 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 162, 171–72 (2005). 
214. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. On one occasion, he incorrectly 
stated that the Security Council had required him to focus on genocide cases: “The 
strategy of prosecution as dictated by the Security Council is to concentrate on those 
bearing the greatest responsibility for the genocide, the leaders of the genocide.” 
Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutor, ICTR, The OTP-ICTR: Ongoing Challenges of Completion 
6 (Nov. 1, 2004) (emphasis added); see also Reydams, supra note 54, at 986. 
215. See Hassan B. Jallow, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 5–
6 (listing four criteria: “the status of the offender” during the genocide; “the nature and 
extent of the [individual’s] participation”; “the nature of the offence”; and the “issue of 
national reconciliation”). 
216. Jallow, supra note 94, at 154. 
217. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 52, pmbl. 
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As a criterion for prosecutorial discretion, national 
reconciliation is very problematic because it means the 
prosecutor is engaged in highly speculative and political 
predictions about what will heal Rwandan society—something 
well beyond his competence. Because “national reconciliation” is 
neither defined nor measured, it can be used to justify any act of 
prosecutorial discretion, such as the prosecutor’s decision to 
allow Rwanda to try the clergy massacre itself. Furthermore, it is 
just as likely (if not more so) that this decision to prosecute only 
one side of the Rwandan conflict will make reconciliation more 
difficult. As Adama Dieng, the Registrar of the ICTR and former 
secretary-general of the International Commission of Jurists, has 
written: 
While the Preambles of the Tribunals and the International 
Criminal Court refer to peace and the deterrence of further 
crimes, their most important mandate is the provision of 
equitable and impartial justice. Deterrence, reconciliation, 
and the maintenance of peace will be logical consequences 
of equitable and impartial justice.218 
The prosecutor also has wide discretion when it comes to 
letting states try suspects and then assessing those domestic trials. 
While the ICTR has “concurrent jurisdiction” with national 
courts, it can exercise its primacy at any stage by requesting 
national courts to “defer” their proceedings.219 Only the 
prosecutor can initiate a request for deferral.220 He “may” do so if 
the matter is already under his investigation.221 The Prosecutor’s 
decision not to request a deferral of Rwanda’s clergy massacre 
trial is not judicially reviewable. 
Prosecutorial discretion is intimately linked to prosecutorial 
independence. The ICTR Statute provides for such 
independence: the Prosecutor “shall not seek or receive 
 
218. Adama Dieng, International Criminal Justice: From Paper to Practice—A 
Contribution from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to the Establishment of the 
International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 688, 700 (2002). 
219. ICTR Statute, supra note 73, at art. 8; ICTR Rules, supra note 134, R. 9–11; see 
also Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE 
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349, 362–63 (1997). 
220. ICTR Rules, supra note 134, R. 9. 
221. Id. 
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instruction from any government or from any other source.”222 
The Prosecutor claims his prosecutorial discretion with respect to 
the RPF cases was based on only two factors (prosecutorial 
independence and the sufficiency of the evidence)—marking yet 
another shift in the criteria. 
But like all the cases we do [i.e., the genocide cases], 
whatever we decide has to be based on the evidence that is 
available. . . . That is the basis on which we have to proceed 
and no other considerations. And we have to proceed also 
having due regard and respect for the independence of the 
Office of the Prosecutor. . . . We can’t accept any attempts to 
improperly influence the position of the Office of the 
Prosecutor in this respect.223 
Such claims of prosecutorial independence ring hollow given the 
pressure that Rwanda put on successive prosecutors not to issue 
indictments for RPF crimes. In that context, the decision not to 
indict any RPF crimes “challenges the image of independence of 
the prosecutor.”224 
The RPF trial underscores the main weakness of 
international criminal justice—its reliance on state cooperation. 
Having been created under the U.N. Security Council’s chapter 
VII powers,225 the ICTR is much stronger than the treaty-based 
ICC. First, it has primacy over national jurisdictions.226 Second, 
the ICTR can call on the Security Council to enforce state 
cooperation, whereas the ICC has to rely on states complying 
with their treaty obligations (except when, as with Darfur, the 
Security Council refers the situation). In fact, however, the ICTR 
was never able to gain Rwanda’s cooperation over its RPF 
investigations—even when it appealed to the Security Council.227 
 
222. ICTR Statute, supra note 73, at art. 15(2). In truth, the prosecutor’s 
independence is circumscribed by the Security Council and the trial chambers. See id. at 
arts. 10, 12, 32. 
223. Hassan B. Jallow, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 12. 
224. Côté, supra note 213, at 177. Côté had good reason  to  be  critical:  as  Chief 
of  Prosecutions  at  the  Special  Court  for  Sierra  Leone,  he  prosecuted  all  sides  of 
the  conflict,  including  powerful  members  of  the  post-conflict  government. Id. at 
162. 
225. See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 52. 
226. See Morris, supra note 219, at 364–65. 
227. The Security Council has proved ineffectual when it comes to international 
criminal justice, first with the ICTR’s RPF investigations and, more recently, with the 
ICC’s Darfur indictments. See, e.g., Alex de Waal, Darfur, the Court and Khartoum: The 
  
2010] “A MERE PRETENSE OF JUSTICE” 1263 
The need for international tribunals to secure state cooperation 
means that international justice is inherently political.228 As 
former ICTR and ICTY prosecutor Del Ponte stated, “The legal 
obligation [for state cooperation] already exists, but in reality, it 
has not been applied. Thus, we always need politics.”229 
B. Complementarity 
Lacking Rwanda’s cooperation, the ICTR prosecutor 
decided to throw away his only remaining card: he essentially 
renounced the ICTR’s jurisdictional primacy in favor of the ICC’s 
model of complementarity.230 Under complementarity, a case (or 
situation)231 is admissible to the ICC where a state is “unwilling or 
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
 
Politics of State Non-Cooperation, in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN 
AFRICA 29–36 (Nicholas Waddell & Phil Clark eds., 2008). 
228. See PESKIN, supra note 45, at 3–24, 235-57. For a legal discussion of state 
cooperation, see ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 160, at 456–76. 
229. Carla Del Ponte, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 21 
(translation provided by Author); see also Carla Del Ponte, Reflections Based on the ICTY’s 
Experience, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AW AND PRACTICE FROM THE ROME 
STATUTE TO ITS REVIEW 129 (Robert Bellelli ed., 2010). Similarly, the former ICTY 
President wrote in 2004: 
[T]he truth is evident: international courts must accommodate themselves to 
the political environment, whether we like it or not. The truth must not be 
denied, as is so poignantly illustrated by the current problems in cooperation 
between the ICTR and the Kigali Government, and between the ICTY and 
certain states in the Balkans . . . . 
Jorda, supra note 1, at 579–80. 
230. See Rome Statute, supra note 208, art. 1. See generally Mohamed M. El Zeidy, 
The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law, 
23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869 (2002) (critiquing the prospects for complementarity at the 
ICC). 
231. The ICC prosecutor’s investigation begins with a more general “situation” and 
progresses to a concrete “case” involving identified suspects. See Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation of the Republic of Kenya, Case No. 
ICC-01/09, ¶ 41 (Mar. 31, 2010) (clarifying that an investigation begins as a “situation” 
before reaching the status of a “case”). Even though the Statute uses the term “case” in 
discussing admissibility, Rome Statute, supra note 205, art. 17, one pre-trial chamber 
recently held that admissibility determinations also apply to “situations.” Situation in 
Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation of the Republic of Kenya, ¶¶ 45–48. On the distinction 
between situations and cases, see, for example, Rod Rastan, What is a “Case” for the 
Purpose of the Rome Statute? 19 CRIM. L.F. 435 (2008). 
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prosecution.”232 This “unwillingness” prong has sparked 
considerable debate over how the ICC should treat non-
prosecutorial mechanisms such as Kenya’s incipient truth 
commission233 and the Acholi reconciliation ceremonies in 
northern Uganda.234 To date, there has not been much academic 
or policy discussions of how the ICC should determine 
unwillingness in the context of domestic trials,235 partly because 
the ICC has yet to face this situation.236 Yet, as both the ICC 
Statute and the Gakurazo trial demonstrate, such determinations 
will be anything but straightforward. 
The ICC Statute provides some guidance on what constitutes 
unwillingness, but leaves room for both judicial interpretation 
and prosecutorial discretion.237 The Statute sets forth three tests 
for determining unwillingness: 
 
232. Rome Statute, supra note 208, art. 17. Yet, as William Schabas has observed, 
“The term ‘complementarity’ may be somewhat of a misnomer, because what is 
established is a relationship between international justice and national justice that is far 
from ‘complementary.’ Rather, the two systems function in opposition and to some 
extent hostility with respect to each other.” WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 67 (1st ed. 2001). 
233. See Lydiah Kemunto Bosire, Misconceptions I—The ICC and the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission (Oxford Transitional Justice Research, Working Papers Series 
No. 15), available at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/Bosire_.pdf; see also SCHABAS, 
supra note 232, at 68–69 (discussing debate over truth commissions during drafting of 
ICC statute). 
234. See, e.g., Tim Allen, Ritual (Ab)use? Problems with Traditional Justice in Northern 
Uganda, in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 47, 47–54 
(Nicholas Waddell & Phil Clark eds., 2008); Marieke Wierda & Michael Otim, Justice at 
Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda, in COURTING 
CONFLICT?, supra, at 21, 21–28. 
235. See Jennifer S. Easterday, Deciding the Fate of Complementarity: A Colombian Case 
Study, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 49, 51–52 (2009) (arguing that the Justice and Peace 
Law demonstrates Colombia’s unwillingness to prosecute human rights abusers and 
calling for ICC involvement); Gregory S. McNeal, ICC Inability Determinations in Light of 
the Dujail Case, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 325 (2007) (examining complementarity in 
light of the practice at the Iraqi High Tribunal). 
236. This may change if Kenya begins national prosecutions. See Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the situation of the Republic of Kenya, Case No. 
ICC-01/09, ¶¶ 53–54 (Mar. 31, 2010); Press Conference, ICC, Press Conference by the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo (Nov. 26, 2009), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/
ac13413d-d097-4527-b0ae-60cf6dbb1b68/281313/lmointrostatement26112009_2_2.pdf. 
237. See Rome Statute, supra note 208, arts. 17–18, 53. While article 17’s criteria for 
admissibility are addressed to the Court, the prosecutor is obliged to consider 
admissibility when deciding whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution. Id. arts. 
17, 53. 
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In order to determine unwillingness in a particular 
case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the 
principles of due process recognized by international law, 
whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: 
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken . . . 
for the purpose of shielding the person concerned 
from criminal responsibility for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court . . . ; 
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the 
proceedings which in the circumstances is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice; 
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being 
conducted independently or impartially, and they 
were or are being conducted in a manner which, 
in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent 
to bring the person concerned to justice.238 
The first test will be difficult to meet as it requires a showing 
of the state’s subjective intent in bringing the proceedings. By 
contrast, the second test is more objective as it looks only to 
whether there has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings. 
Although the Statute does not define an “unjustified” delay, the 
ICC is likely to look to international human rights law on what 
constitutes a speedy trial.239 Nevertheless, this test is not much 
help when it comes to judging domestic proceedings once they 
are already underway.240 The most useful test then for uncovering 
 
238. Rome Statute, supra note 208, art. 17(2). For a more detailed and somewhat 
different interpretation of this provision, see HÉCTOR OLÁSOLO, THE TRIGGERING 
PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 150–54 (2005). Article 17(1)(c) 
refers to article 20(3) which makes an exception to the prohibition against double 
jeopardy (ne bis in idem) for ICC prosecutions where the national proceedings: 
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal 
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or 
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in 
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international 
law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 
Rome Statute, supra note 208, art. 20(3). 
239. For relevant international case law, see ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Informal 
Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice, at 36, ICC Doc. ICC-01/04-01/07-
1008-AnxA (Mar. 30, 2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc654724.pdf. 
240. After all, the threat of international proceedings was expected to kick-start 
domestic proceedings, perhaps after an unjustified delay. 
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non-genuine (or sham) proceedings is the third, which requires 
both an objective determination of non-independence (or 
partiality) and a more subjective finding that the proceedings are 
“inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice.” Under all three tests, however, the ICC must look 
beyond whether the domestic proceedings conform to fair trial 
standards and examine whether they were “genuine.”241 
The ICC Statute is unclear about whether the Court should 
look more to process or result in determining whether a specific 
domestic trial is genuine or not. As two legal scholars rightly 
note: 
The language of the Rome Statute seems to indicate that a 
result that shields the accused from justice would be 
impermissible, yet it makes reference only to the 
“proceedings” to determine willingness to prosecute. It is 
therefore difficult to tell if the Court’s decision would be 
based on the process undertaken or the final verdict reached 
or sentence given.242 
An expert panel on complementarity, convened by the 
prosecutor in 2003, insisted that an assessment must be based on 
“procedural and institutional factors, not the substantive outcome.”243 
The panel also pointed out that the prosecutor bears the burden 
of proof for showing that domestic proceedings are not genuine, 
and that there should be “a policy of giving the benefit of the 
doubt to States exercising jurisdiction and assuming that they are 
acting in good faith.”244 
Fundamentally, it is harder to prove a sham trial (one 
designed to acquit) than the more common show trial (one 
designed to convict). Show trials usually fall foul of fair trial 
standards, whereas sham trials may entail an excess of due process 
 
241. See SCHABAS, supra note 232, at 67 (noting that the “enigmatic adjective 
‘genuinely’ [in article 17] is left entirely to the appreciation of the court”). For 
discussions of “genuinely,” see Informal Expert Paper, supra note 239, at 8–9, and El-Zeidy, 
supra note 230, at 900–01. 
242. William W. Burke-White & Scott Kaplan, Shaping the Contours of Domestic Justice: 
The International Criminal Court and an Admissibility Challenge in the Uganda Situation 
(Univ. Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper 
No. 08-13, 2008) (footnotes omitted). 
243. Informal Expert Paper, supra note 239, at 14. 
244. Id. at 16–17. 
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for the accused. The expert panel recognized the difficulty of 
proving that domestic proceedings are not genuine: 
To demonstrate “unwillingness” may be technically difficult 
(likely involving inferences and circumstantial evidence) and 
politically sensitive (amounting to an accusation against the 
authorities). It is possible that a regime may employ 
sophisticated schemes to cover up involvement and to 
whitewash crimes, so information and analytic tools are 
needed to penetrate such tactics.245 
Consequently, the panel provided the prosecutor with a four-
page list of factors to consider in assessing unwillingness.246 
Several legal theorists worry that complementarity does not 
give sufficient deference to national (or local-level) proceedings. 
For Mark Drumbl, the concern is that the ICC will crowd out 
alternative, nonprosecutorial mechanisms for truth seeking, 
justice, and reparations, such as truth commissions.247 
Consequently, he proposes the ICC give “qualified deference” to 
national and local mechanisms.248 On the other hand, William 
Burke-White fears that states are passing the buck for prosecuting 
international crimes to the ICC.249 To counter this, he 
recommends “proactive complementarity”: the ICC should “use 
political leverage to encourage states to undertake their own 
prosecutions of international crimes.”250 
 
245. Id. at 14. 
246. Id. at 28–31. 
247. Mark A. Drumbl, Policy Through Complementarity: The Atrocity Trial as 
Justice (Sept. 15, 2009) (unpublished) (arguing that “complementarity may encourage 
heterogeneity in terms of the number of institutions adjudicating international crimes, 
but it encourages homogeneity in terms of the process they follow and the punishment 
they mete out. Complementarity, as operationalized in [ICC] admissibility 
determinations, promotes the iconic status of the courtroom and the jailhouse as the 
best practice to promote justice in the aftermath of grave mass violence.”); see also 
SCHABAS, supra note 232, at 68; Informal Expert Paper, supra note 239, at 22–23. 
248. Drumbl, supra note 247. According to him, “Qualified deference creates a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of local or national institutions that, unlike 
complementarity, does not search for procedural symmetry between their process and 
liberal criminal procedure and, unlike primacy, does not explicitly impose liberal 
criminal procedure.” Id. 
249. See Burke-White, supra note 14, at 59. 
250. Id. at 54. See generally Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: the 
Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due Process, 17 CRIM. L.F. 255 (2008) 
(arguing that complementarity will encourage national trials that lack due process); 
Carsten Stahn, Complementarity: a Tale of Two Notions, 19 CRIM. L.F. 87 (2008) 
(contrasting “classical” and “positive” complementarity). 
  
1268 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1221 
While sharing some of Drumbl and Burke-White’s concerns, 
this Author worries more that the ICC will give too much 
deference to national proceedings, not too little. The political 
reality is that the ICC has very little power vis-à-vis states. This 
weakness partly explains why complementarity has been 
something of a bust so far. The ICC’s architects assumed the 
court would prod states to do genuine, domestic prosecutions to 
preclude the court from exercising jurisdiction. They counted on 
targeted states being jealous guardians of their national 
sovereignty.251 However, the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, turned this thinking on its head. He “adopted a policy 
of inviting voluntary referrals from states to increase the 
likelihood of important cooperation and support on the 
ground.”252 The governments of the Central African Republic, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda proved only too 
happy to make “self-referrals” to the ICC.253 Self-referrals offer 
 
251. See, e.g., ROBERT CRYER, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: SELECTIVITY 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REGIME 164 (2005) (predicting that “States, 
particularly in relation to offenses by their nationals, are more likely to prefer to 
investigate at the national level, rather than have an investigation proceeded with in 
public by an independent international investigator”). States may prefer to conduct 
national investigations of their own officials or armed forces, but they seem more than 
willing to let the international community investigate nationals who belong to armed 
rebel movements. 
252. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on the Activities Performed During the First 
Three Years (June 2003–June 2006), at 2 (Sept. 12, 2006), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/d76a5d89-fb64-47a9-9821-725747378ab2/143680/
otp_3yearreport20060914_english.pdf; see also Peskin, supra note 15, at 656–57. This 
approach seemed to contradict the view the prosecutor espoused on taking office. On 
that occasion, Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo stated that “the absence of trials 
before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, 
would be a major success.” Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC, Ceremony for 
the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 2 
(June 16, 2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/
d7572226-264a-4b6b-85e3-2673648b4896/143585/
030616_moreno_ocampo_english.pdf. Referrals involve country situations rather than 
individual cases. See Report on the Activities Performed During the First Three Years, supra, at 
7. 
253. Phil Clark, Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case Selection in Uganda 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE 
ICC IN AFRICA, supra note 220, at 37, 37–46; William A. Schabas, ‘Complementarity in 
Practice’: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 19 CRIM. L.F. 5, 16 (2008). Schabas also 
questions whether self-referral is authorized and compatible with the Rome Statute. Id. 
at 12–18; see also William W. Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice: The International 
Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 557, 559 (2005). 
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states several political advantages: they enhance the states’ 
reputation for international cooperation; they significantly 
diminish the likelihood that state officials will be indicted by the 
ICC; they shift the financial and political costs of investigations 
and prosecutions to the international community; and, most 
importantly, they marginalize and pressure their political 
enemies (i.e., rebel leaders) through international arrest 
warrants.254 
Partly as a result of these self-referrals, the ICC has had no 
experience with complementary national trials.255 The RPF trial 
provides one scenario for what a complementary proceeding 
might look like. There, as was meant to happen with the ICC, the 
threat of an international indictment helped spur a reluctant 
state to conduct its own national trial.256 Even if the ICTR 
prosecutor had fulfilled his promise to evaluate whether Rwanda 
had “effectively and fairly prosecuted” the case (instead of 
focusing solely on fairness), he might well have concluded the 
proceedings were genuine under Article 17(2)(c) of the Rome 
Statute.257 On the surface, the proceedings appeared to be 
“conducted independently and impartially”; that is, the military 
judges showed no obvious bias in the courtroom or in the 
judgment.258 Similarly, the proceedings did not seem evidently 
 
254. See Burke-White, supra note 14, at 62–63; Antonio Cassesse, Is the ICC Still 
Having Teething Problems? 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 434, 436 (2006); Peskin, supra note 15, at 
678; Schabas, supra note 253, at 33. Drumbl makes some of these points, albeit more 
tentatively. Drumbl, supra note 247, at 19. 
255. Arguably, the national courts in the Democratic Republic of Congo were 
willing and able to try the three rebel leaders indicted by the ICC prosecutor. As Schabas 
damningly observes, the Congolese courts would have prosecuted Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo for more serious crimes than the ICC is doing. Schabas, supra note 253, at 23–25. 
But see Géraldine Mattioli & Anneke van Woudenberg, Global Catalyst for National 
Prosecutions? The ICC in the Democratic Republic of Congo in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, 
PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA, supra note 227, at 55, 55–64. 
256. Though, as argued above, the Rwandan government was prodded more by 
other political considerations; namely, its desire for transfers of Rwandan genocide 
suspects and the French and Spanish arrest warrants against high-ranking RPF political 
and military figures. 
257. Rome Statute, supra note 208, art. 17. 
258. Perhaps there should be a rebuttable presumption of bias when a military 
court in a military dictatorship tries members of the military. As Broomhall observes, the 
risk of sham proceedings “will be particularly great where police, security forces or the 
military are subject to their own courts . . . .” BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 90 (2004). 
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“inconsistent with an intent to bring” the two commanding 
officers to justice: the military prosecutor and court mainly 
applied the correct legal test for command responsibility and the 
prosecutor presented (limited and unconvincing) evidence that 
the commanding officers should have known of the threat posed 
to the clergy. 
To make the argument that the RPF trial was actually a 
sham, it is necessary to look at evidence outside the proceedings 
(looking beyond the trial record)—the widespread and notorious 
nature of RPF massacres and Human Rights Watch’s own factual 
investigation—and challenge the Rwandan military prosecutor’s 
theory of the case. The ICC prosecutor and judges are no more 
likely to do this than the ICTR prosecutor.259 Under 
complementarity, the ICC has an institutional bias to defer to 
national proceedings by its states parties.260 It will not want to 
jeopardize relations with state parties on whose cooperation it 
depends.261 In addition, the ICC is not meant to act as a court of 
 
259. The expert panel’s incredibly detailed suggestions for fact-finding and 
analyzing “unwillingness” will probably prove to be an exercise in wishful thinking 
because of political and resource constraints. See ICC, supra note 239, at 11–14, 28–31. 
260. The ICC has not deferred to national proceedings in Sudan, which is not a 
party to the Rome Statute. The Sudanese government established the Special Criminal 
Court on the Events in Darfur (“SCCED”) the day after the ICC prosecutor opened his 
investigation into Darfur. See Decree Establishing the Special Criminal Court on the 
Events in Darfur (June 7, 2005), in Letter dated 18 June 2005 from the Chargé d’affaire 
a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2005/403 (June 22, 2005). The 
SCCED has been widely criticized for failing to provide meaningful justice. See, e.g., 
Human Rights Watch, Lack of Conviction: The Special Criminal Court on the Events in 
Darfur, June 2006, available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/ij/sudan0606/
sudan0606.pdf; Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Sudan: New Report Shows Courts & Investigations 
Fail to Bring Justice to Victims in Darfur, Oct. 28, 2007; Elizabeth Rubin, If Not Peace, Then 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 2, 2006, at 42. 
261. See ICC, supra note 239, at 3 (“Cooperative States should generally benefit 
from a presumption of bona fides and baseline levels of scrutiny . . . .”). For example, 
the ICC Statute allows the ICC to assist states with their investigations and prosecutions. 
Rome Statute, supra note 208, art. 93(10). It has been recognized that this requires 
“caution to avoid being exploited in efforts to legitimize or shield inadequate national 
efforts from criticism.” Informal Expert Paper, supra note 239, at 7. Zahar and Sluiter 
point to the ICTY’s enormous reluctance to use Rule 9(ii) to assert primacy over 
domestic proceedings. ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 160, at 455. The wording of ICTY 
Rule 9(ii) is very similar to that of article 17(2)(c) of the ICC Statute: it allows the ICTY 
prosecutor to request deferral of domestic proceedings where “there is a lack of 
impartiality or independence, or the investigations or proceedings are designed to 
shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case is not diligently 
prosecuted.” ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 9(ii), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.44 
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appeal for unsuccessful national prosecutions.262 Thus, the ICC 
prosecutor and judges will be reluctant to substitute their theory 
of the case and evidentiary findings for those of domestic 
actors.263 Finally, the ICC will be loathe to divert resources from 
its own investigations and prosecutions to make in-depth 
assessments of unwillingness.264 Overall, the ICC, like the ICTR 
before it, is likely to prove unable or unwilling to recognize sham 
national proceedings designed to shield perpetrators from 
justice. 
C. Victor’s Justice 
Following his determination that the RPF trial was fair, the 
prosecutor indicated that he would not issue any indictments for 
other RPF crimes. In response to questions during his June 2009 
Security Council appearance, Jallow stated that “my Office does 
not have an indictment that is ready in respect of [RPF] 
allegations at this particular stage.”265 He subsequently offered 
three rationales for not bringing any RPF prosecutions: 
It’s not that the OTP [Office of the Prosecutor] is reluctant 
to do its work, but its work has to be based on acceptable 
evidence presented by credible witnesses which offers us a 
reasonable chance of success. And we also then have to take 
into account other factors, issues of reconciliation, the fact 
that . . . there is actually a lot of work which we ought to do 
 
(Dec. 10, 2009). There appears to be only one instance where the ICTY prosecutor 
invoked Rule 9(ii), but the trial chamber did not rule on that specific point. ZAHAR & 
SLUITER, supra note 160, at 451. 
262. See, e.g., ICC, supra note 239, at 16 (stating that “[t]he standard for assessing 
‘genuineness’ should reflect appropriate deference to national systems as well as the fact 
that the ICC is not an international court of appeal, nor is it a human rights body 
designed to monitor all imperfections of legal systems”). 
263. Before agreeing on the term “genuinely,” the drafters of article 17 rejected 
the term “effectively” “because of a concern that the ICC might judge a legal system 
against a perfectionist standard (for example, that the ICC might set aside proceedings 
because, in the Court’s opinion, the prosecution might have chosen a more effective 
strategy). Id. at 8 n.9. 
264. See El-Zeidy, supra note 230, at 899 (predicting that “[t]he nature of the 
‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’ tests will in many cases demand greater resources of the 
prosecutor in preparing the admissibility argument than proving the guilt of the alleged 
perpetrator”). This is also unwittingly demonstrated by the expert panel’s lengthy 
investigative checklist for uncovering unwillingness. ICC, supra note 239, at 28–31. 
265. U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 (June 4, 
2009). 
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also on the major crime base [i.e., genocide] which we are 
still unable to do.266 
In other words, the prosecutor’s office does not have “acceptable 
evidence” to bring RPF indictments and will not gather more 
evidence because its priorities are genocide cases. And even if it 
did acquire “acceptable evidence” in the future, it would turn the 
case over to the Rwandan government for prosecution in the 
interests of “national reconciliation” as it did with that of the 
clergy massacre. 
It is now clear the ICTR will not bring any indictments, let 
alone proceedings, for RPF crimes,267 and it will remain satisfied 
with the Rwandan military having prosecuted just one war crimes 
case.268 By failing to prosecute any RPF crimes, the ICTR has 
rendered “victor’s justice”269 in the sense that it has only 
prosecuted the losing side of Rwanda’s civil war. To put it more 
starkly, it has only tried Hutu defendants (with the exception of 
one European). This sets the ICTR apart from the ICTY and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, which have prosecuted 
individuals from all sides of those conflicts.270 
Rwanda offers perhaps the most sympathetic case for 
“victor’s justice” because the victor’s crimes are dwarfed by the 
loser’s crimes. As Rwanda’s prosecutor general wrote, “it was the 
RPF that had to contend with the génocidaires as Rwanda was 
 
266. Hassan B. Jallow, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 15. 
267. Filip Reyntjens came to this conclusion several years earlier when the 
December 2004 deadline for ICTR investigations passed without any announcement of 
RPF indictments. Letter from Filip Reyntjens, Professor, University of Antwerp, to 
Hassan B. Jallow, ICTR Prosecutor (Jan. 11, 2005) (on file with author). In protest, he 
withdrew as an expert witness for the prosecution. Id. 
268. Jallow’s claim that the Rwandan military prosecutor has prosecuted “up to two 
dozen senior military officers,” U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.6134 (June 4, 2009), is highly disingenuous as none of those prosecutions (apart 
from the clergy massacre) were for war crimes and most of the murder cases involved 
low-ranking soldiers. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.  
269. Thierry Cruvellier provocatively refers to the ICTR as “loser’s justice” because 
it was run by the U.N. and international community, which had lost their credibility in 
1994 by failing to stop the genocide. CRUVELLIER, supra note 44, at 164-67. Still, it was 
the Tribunal’s very weakness that enabled the RPF to use it for accomplishing victor’s 
justice. 
270. For a breakdown of ICTY prosecutions by sides, see Haskell & Waldorf, supra 
note 201, at 17. On the Special Court for Sierra Leone, see, for example, Thierry 
Cruvellier, Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, From the Taylor Trial to a Lasting Legacy: 
Putting the Special Court Model to the Test, at 24–28, June 2009, available at http://ictj.org/
static/Publications/ICTJ_SLE_TaylorTrialtoLastingLegacy_pb2009.pdf. 
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abandoned by the international community, and any crimes the 
RPF may have committed in doing so paled in comparison to the 
crimes committed by the génocidaires.”271 From that perspective, 
even-handedness may appear morally dubious insofar as it 
suggests an equivalency between genocide and RPF crimes. The 
ICTR prosecutor essentially made this argument in his spirited 
response to criticism from Human Rights Watch: 
I do not share your views that the Tribunal will be seen to 
deliver victors [sic] justice unless the members of the RPF 
are prosecuted at the ICTR. The [ICTR] has understandably 
focused for many years [on] the genocide as this is the main 
crime base of its mandate.272 
Several prominent legal scholars have also challenged the notion 
of victor’s justice. William Schabas dismisses it as “an empty 
slogan, based upon unproven hypotheses and a lot of 
conjecture.”273 Mark Drumbl also questions “whether victor’s 
justice necessarily taints the legitimacy of law.”274 
Here, I want to take up Schabas’ challenge to engage in 
“much closer scrutiny of the idea that [victor’s justice] is causing 
some great harm.”275 Let me state at the outset what I mean by 
the term. Victor’s justice is an extreme form of selective 
prosecution which occurs when only members of the losing side 
are prosecuted.276 I am not suggesting the ICTR could have, or 
should have, rendered equal justice. The goal is not parity (i.e., 
indicting equal numbers of suspects from each side of the 
conflict), but rather some measure of impartiality. In other 
 
271. Ngoga, supra note 26, at 331. This bears a marked resemblance to Kenneth 
Anderson’s argument that the right to administer universal justice must be morally 
earned: “You didn’t intervene—but you still have the right to conduct a trial? On what 
moral basis, pray? Your prudence or your cowardice?” Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of 
International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences, 20 EUROPEAN J. OF INT’L 
L. 331, 338–39 (2009). 
272. June 22, 2009 Letter from Jallow to Roth, supra note 134 at 3. 
273. PhD Studies in Human Rights, http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/ 
(Aug. 16, 2009, 06:48); see also William A. Schabas, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, 
supra note 86, at 26. 
274. Mark A. Drumbl, Book Review, 20 CRIM. L.F. 495, 498 (2009) (reviewing 
PESKIN, supra note 45) (internal citations omitted). 
275. Remarks of William A. Schabas, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra 
note 86, at 26. Given space constraints, I can only briefly sketch a response to Schabas; a 
fuller argument can be found in Haskell & Waldorf, supra note 201, at 19–27. 
276. Both victors’ tribunals (such as the Nuremberg tribunal) and nonvictors’ 
tribunals (such as the ICTR) can produce victor’s justice. 
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words, if the ICTR had prosecuted just one RPF soldier (even a 
low-ranking one), then it could be criticized for unfairness, but 
not for victor’s justice. 
Victor’s justice at the ICTR does harm to victims as well as to 
international norms and institutions.277 Victor’s justice unjustly 
discriminates among victims. As Des Forges wrote in her last 
Human Rights Watch report: 
To insist on the right to justice for all victims, as did the 
[1994] UN Commission of Experts, is not to deny the 
genocide, nor does such an insistence equate war crimes with 
genocide; it simply asserts that all victims, regardless of their 
affiliation, regardless of the nature of the crime committed 
against them, and regardless of the affiliation of the 
perpetrator, must have equal opportunity to seek redress for 
the wrongs done them.278 
Des Forges’ statement is grounded in fundamental human rights 
tenets—dignity, equality, and universality—and reflects recent 
developments in human rights norms, such as the U.N. 
principles on justice and reparations for victims of gross human 
rights violations.279 If there is no hierarchy of suffering—if, that 
is, victims of RPF crimes suffer just as much as victims of the 
genocide—then no group of victims are more deserving of justice 
than another.280  
Even if there is an equality of suffering among victims, there 
may still be a hierarchy of harm from the international 
community’s perspective.281 This is reflected in the usual 
 
277. For other arguments, see Haskell & Waldorf, supra note 201, at 19–27. 
278. Human Rights Watch, supra note 21, at 90. 
279. See, e.g., Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparations for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, Annex, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/147/Annex (Mar. 21, 2006); Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/34/Annex 
(Nov. 29, 1985). 
280. Of course, the political reality is that “[s]ome victims count more than 
others,” BASS, supra note 42, at 278. But that does not negate the moral argument that 
all victims should count equally. 
281. As Schabas states: 
Of course there is a sense in which all such crimes are equivalent. The victims 
of these atrocities—and I am not gainsaying that Dresden and the RPF 
reprisals were not atrocities—suffer every bit as much. For that matter, it is 
hardly the concern of a victim whether they suffer as a result of genocide or a 
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taxonomy of international crimes that places genocide (the 
“crime of crimes”) at the apex. As one legal scholar explained, 
“genocide poses more harm than crimes against humanity or war 
crimes because of the explicit intent to destroy a group, the 
discrimination animating the perpetrator’s action, and the 
implicit element of collective action inherent in the commission 
of the crime.”282 International case law seems divided on this 
score. The ICTR jurisprudence is simply inconsistent,283 while the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber has ruled that “there is in law no 
distinction between the seriousness of a crime against humanity 
and that of a war crime.”284 Assuming for argument’s sake that 
this hierarchy does exist, it still does not determine the 
comparative gravity when specific crimes are at issue.285 Is one 
instance of incitement to genocide really more grave than the 
murder (as a war crime) of thirteen clergy and two other 
civilians? The ICTR prosecutor essentially implied that genocide 
crimes are always more grave than war crimes when he defended 
his decision not to indict any RPF war crimes. 
Second, victor’s justice harms the legitimacy of international 
tribunals and international criminal law because their (post-
Nuremberg) justification rests, in part, on claims that they are 
more impartial (i.e., more cosmopolitan) than national tribunals 
and domestic criminal law. International tribunals applying 
international criminal law should more closely approximate the 
rule of law (liberal legalism)—with its emphasis on procedural 
 
garden-variety murder. But obviously other concerns are afoot when we are 
dealing with international criminal justice. 
PhD Studies in Human Rights, http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/ (Aug. 16, 
2009, 06:48) 
282. Alliston Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International 
Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 483 (2001). 
283. Compare Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and 
Sentence, ¶ 981 (Jan. 27, 2000) (opining that “genocide constitutes the ‘crime of 
crimes’”), and Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 53 (July 9, 
2004) (same), with Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Judgment, ¶ 590 
(May 26, 2003) (insisting that “there is no hierarchy of crimes under the Statute”).  
284. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-A bis, Judgment in 
Sentencing Appeals, ¶ 69 (Jan. 26, 2000). But see Schabas, supra note 253, at 26 (arguing 
that international criminal law does create a hierarchy of crimes). 
285. In assessing gravity, prosecutors and judges need to look to specific contexts 
rather than abstract hierarchies. See Danner, supra note 282, at 463 n.196, 477–78 
(providing possible methods of assessing gravity of crimes and arguing that crimes 
should be viewed differently based on the context in which it was committed, 
respectively). 
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fairness and equality before the law—than domestic courts 
applying domestic criminal law. By failing to do this, 
international tribunals undermine the expressive justification for 
international criminal law and hence weaken the diffusion of 
liberal legalist norms.286 This is what makes the ICC prosecutor’s 
one-sided prosecutions against non-state actors in the Central 
African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
Uganda so worrying.287 
CONCLUSION 
Rwanda—a small, weak state—has skillfully played the ICTR 
to enhance both its international and national ambitions at the 
expense of the international community.288 This demonstrates 
just how easy it is for states to hijack international criminal justice 
mechanisms and turn them into a continuation of (civil) war by 
other means. Rwanda’s neighbors have learned this lesson only 
too well. The Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic 
 
286. Drumbl argues that “the most plausible aspiration of international criminal 
law” is “an expressive, norm-generating social constructivism” rather than “concrete 
deterrence [or] hard retribution.” Drumbl, supra note 274, at 498. Yet, it is hard to 
reconcile this eminently sensible position with his claim that: 
indiscriminately prosecuting all sides to a conflict is no guarantor of legitimacy 
either. When the SCSL [Special Court of Sierra Leone] Appeals Chamber 
ruled that “fighting for a just cause” could not serve as a mitigating factor in 
sentencing in the [Civil Defence Forces] case, it may have upheld the 
neutrality of the law but it also contradicted the way many Sierra Leoneans 
perceive the aggregated gravity of the violence. 
Id. This seems to conflate institutional legitimacy with popular opinion. In addition, it 
unfairly characterizes impartial prosecutions as “indiscriminately prosecuting all sides.” 
Id. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the key debate between the majority and the 
dissenting judge (a Sierra Leone national) in the Civil Defence Forces (“CDF”) appeal 
case was over sentencing mitigation—not over whether the CDF should have been 
prosecuted in the first place. See Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-
A, Judgment, ¶¶ 513–35 (May 28, 2008); see also Cruvellier, From the Taylor Trial to a 
Lasting Legacy: Putting the Special Court Model to the Test, supra note 270, at 24–28 
(discussing the CDF trial and mitigating factors). 
287. The exception so far has been the prosecutor’s indictments against several 
parties to the Darfur conflict, including Sudan’s president and several rebel leaders. See 
ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/
situations+and+cases/situations/situation+icc+0205/. This different (and far more 
impartial) approach is due to the fact that the Darfur situation was a referral from the 
U.N. Security Council, rather than a self-referral from a state party. 
288. This undercuts the overly simplistic, realist argument that international 
criminal trials “are used by strong nations to assert their international ambitions at the 
expense of weak nations.” Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and International Law, 
55 DUKE L.J. 75, 147 (2005). 
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of Congo, and Uganda have used self-referrals to the 
International Criminal Court to enhance their international 
prestige while ensuring that victor’s justice is imposed on their 
enemies.289 The ICC prosecutor, desperate for state cooperation, 
has been only too eager to oblige. If and when the time comes 
for the ICC to “judge” complementary national trials, Rwanda’s 
trial of the clergy massacre strongly suggests that the ICC will be 
unwilling or unable to recognize sham domestic national 
proceedings designed to shield the accused, not least because the 
ICC is even more reliant on state cooperation than the ICTR. 
Given his dependence on states, what is an international 
prosecutor to do? Rwanda had made clear it was never going to 
cooperate with an RPF prosecution by handing over suspects or 
evidence to the Tribunal. It had also shown it could shut down 
the Tribunal’s genocide trials by stopping the flow of witnesses 
and not face any meaningful international censure. At that point, 
the ICTR prosecutor should have publicly stated that without 
Security Council pressure to force Rwandan cooperation, the 
Tribunal would produce victor’s justice. That would have placed 
the onus back where it really belonged—on the international 
community that had created the Tribunal’s mandate in the first 
place. Instead, the prosecutor allowed Rwanda to hold a 
domestic trial for the clergy massacre and then proclaimed it 
satisfactory. He chose to acquiesce in a pretense of justice rather 
than recognize an absence of justice. That choice not only 
tarnishes the Tribunal’s real accomplishments, it also sets a 
terrible precedent for the future of international justice. 
 
289. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. Again, this punctures Posner’s 
realist argument that “international criminal tribunals will similarly look like efforts by 
the governments that influence the prosecutor and judges—whether the Security 
Council (in ad hoc cases) or the members of the ICC—to harass or embarrass states with 
contrary foreign policy objectives.” Posner, supra note 288, at 149. 
